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THE HUMANISM OF ERICH FROMM

by

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Abstract

Humanism as an approach manifests itself in a wide variety of areas, including psychoanalysis. This essay in intellectual history attempts to describe the structure and content of humanism in the work of the psychoanalyst Erich Fromm.

Since it was not my aim to compare Fromm's work to the great humanists of the past, save Sigmund Freud, I have refrained from any general discussion of humanism per se. Rather, I have used contemporary definitions to show that Fromm is a humanist. My description of Fromm's work emphasizes his theory of human growth; concepts such as alienation, real self, false self, social character, human autonomy, and authoritarian society, are shown to be derived from these ideas on human growth. The latter part of this essay widens the perspective on Fromm's humanism by discussing his relationship to Sigmund Freud, presenting his notion of what is involved in psychotherapy, and finally by dealing with Fromm as a prophet. I attempt to show that Fromm's rejection of Freud's pessimistic humanism is the result of his view of Freud the man, his rejection of Freud's mechanistic instinct theories, as well as his denial of Freud's

pessimism concerning the possibilities of building an ameliorative society. The discussion of Fromm's notion of psychotherapy emphasizes that the enlightenment of persons as to the truth of their condition can, and does, result in people who will adopt standards different from those which are customary in contemporary societies. In this sense Fromm believes psychotherapy can be a political, even a revolutionary process. Finally, because Fromm uses psychoanalysis as a tool to unmask the true quality of modern culture, he attempts to speak to possible alternate futures for mankind. I present the context within which this prophetism appears by describing his associations, either direct or indirect, with other philosophies and world-views that also attempt to prophesy the future of the human condition.

The conclusion to this essay places Fromm's claims to objectivity for his psychoanalytical humanism in proper perspective by emphasizing that his work, like all scientific work, must be understood as one more phase in the human endeavour to create meaningful metaphors with which to comprehend existence.

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I: Introduction

Ever since the death of Sigmund Freud, researchers have been studying and analysing the rise of psychoanalysis. Not only those intimately connected with its developments have shown great interest in this topic, but persons from the humanities have also increasingly recognized the importance of psychoanalysis for all aspects of Western culture. If, as Phillip Rieff has stated, we have witnessed the rise of 'psychological man' (a cultural type who psychologizes incessantly about all aspects of daily life) largely as a result of Freud's work, then this event will justifiedly be a topic for the historian's craft.¹

At least some of the impetus for a more historical and non-scientific approach to dynamic psychiatry and its offspring -- psychoanalysis -- has come from inside science itself. Researchers like Thomas Kuhn and Werner Heisenberg have written extensively to prove that the evolution of science is not always governed by logical principles. For example, Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions observes that scientific innovations take place when the underlying presuppositions guiding investigative procedure are loosened to account for hitherto unexplainable data in terms of conventional paradigms. It is the perceptual

presuppositions of the researcher which in the last analysis decide what is reality and what is 'evidence'. Because perceptual presuppositions are not the result of scientific objectivity but rather the result of cultural influences, it is impossible to say that radical scientific innovations are the result of a logical development from previous scientific principles. Therefore it is not an exaggeration to claim that personal and cultural revolutions can initiate scientific ones.².

In Physics and Philosophy Heisenberg points out that the growth of scientific paradigms is often influenced by the principle of complementarity. This principle arises out of the realisation by scientists, notably physicists, that often two or more apparently conflicting theories are needed to fully describe a phenomenon; the principle is fully applicable to the history of psychology and psychoanalysis.³. No one great system can cover the entire range of psychic phenomena with complete impunity, and therefore we must borrow from a variety of systems to adequately understand the psyche. It is possible therefore, to understand why two diametrically opposed psychological systems can co-exist side by side in a given culture, and why the continuing growth of systems such as Erich Fromm's is of vital importance.

If then, as Rieff contends, psychological man "...lives neither by the ideal of might nor right which confused his ancestors, political and religious man.",⁴.

but instead "...lives by the ideal of insight -- practical experimental insight leading to a mastery of his own personality.",⁵ knowledge of psychologies and their cultural context will be of value to him in illuminating his personality. Accurate pictures of developments in the growth of psychology are then of great importance. Historians too, increasingly demand ever more accurate assessments of the time-periods they study, and for this reason lucid pictures of thought paradigms, be they in the sciences or humanities, serve more than just conceptual elucidation as an end in itself, but also shed light on the general tenor of an age.

In this thesis I attempt to present a well-rounded picture of Erich Fromm's thought, its major focal points, its place in the context of the history of psychoanalysis, its relationship to what is known of Fromm's life, and its relationship to certain other cultural trends in the twentieth century. All this is intended to come under the general theme of humanism -- that is, the vital concern for man as he is in the twentieth century. Above all I aim to instill in the reader the general impression that Fromm's paradigm is not merely the product of scientific ratiocination, but is like all other paradigms, the result of what one person considers to be universal human priorities. In this sense Fromm's psychological paradigm will at least marginally be shown to be the result of a hidden historical-ethical one.

II: Humanism

Essential to a description of humanism, a field with which this paper is concerned, is a clear notion of what the term means. Since Erich Fromm is a modern writer it would seem reasonable to use a modern definition of humanism when examining his works. H.J. Blackham, director of the British Humanist Association, writes:

Humanism proceeds from an assumption that man is on his own and this life is all, and an assumption of responsibility for one's own life and for the life of mankind -- an appraisal and an undertaking, two personal decisions.^{1.}

This definition leads Blackham to conclude that not only does humanism require love and enthusiasm for the world, but also demands that we see man as a self-determined end in himself.^{2.} Self-determination must of course be extended to individual's society and mankind in general.^{3.} Changes for the sake of self-determination must be based on a reasonable use of empirically tested evidence.^{4.} However, Blackham regards reason only as a servant, the task of reason being to inform us of the nature of the choices we make.^{5.} In other words it is incorrect to unquestionably assume that all humanists are radical empiricists rejecting the security of metaphysical systems

in favor of an extremely rational approach. Such an attitude is excessively dogmatic in light of the open-mindedness usually associated with humanistic thinkers. "There is no humanist metaphysic, but any humanist who shivers or feels ashamed has a choice of outfit off the peg."⁶. Any adopted metaphysic is, however, retained only as long as it proves useful to humanistic ideals.

Finally, it is the humanist's belief that man, once he begins to live in an improved world, can be more human than he is in the present situation.⁷ His dictum runs as follows: "Man is not born human, he becomes human in a society."⁸. Whether or not the humanist takes action to ameliorate the world-condition depends of course on how he perceives that condition, but in any case he will always feel himself responsible for his own life and that of mankind in general. "...humanists are concerned primarily with the truth of the human situation; if in fact it is gloomy, and they have to build on despair or the other side of despair, so be it; at least they can build, and do not have to turn bored and indolent or violent and destructive. Nihilism does not follow logically from humanist principles."⁹. Humanists thus have the option of finding the world to their satisfaction, or rejecting it and exchanging their dissatisfaction for responsibility in action to change it.¹⁰.

Yet the assumptions upon which humanist action bases itself should not be dogmatic, because humanism is

more a passion than an intellectual position.¹¹ Since humanism lives and works only through the lives of people, they can only dispense a humanism, not humanism.¹² Consequently there are humanist philosophies and non-humanistic philosophies, but not a particular philosophy of humanism.¹³ The creation of a supreme philosophy of humanism would mean that its inherent experimentalism would disappear and the readiness to break away from old ways of perception and action to benefit man would no longer be possible. Needless to say humanism's strength is its flexibility, else it would have been discarded long ago as just another rigid system.

According to Blackham's criteria Fromm qualifies as a humanist. Fromm most certainly thinks man is on his own in this world and that this life is all.¹⁴ He refuses to believe in any 'other worlds' (in the sense of religious 'heavens') or transcendent states of being to which man may aspire, and asserts that religious deities are really only man's idealized self-image projected so as to appear as an entity apart from him. A person's responsibility toward himself as well as others is likewise a Frommian dictum, one based on the theory that a genuine interest in self-development implies an interest in the development of one's fellow man; only by developing with others, not despite them can man advance. Fromm is however one of those humanists, who in Blackham's

definition, has taken a metaphysic 'off the peg', this metaphysic being a mixture of Marxism and psychoanalytic theories. At the same time psychoanalysis is dynamically linked to Fromm's particular form of humanist action, because in his view it expresses his responsibility to awaken man to factors hindering his self-development by presenting the truth of the human condition. This is of course the vaunting element in Frommian humanism: where Marx described the truth about man's social and economic relationships, so psychoanalysis describes the truth about his psychic condition. Moreover, both stress rationalism as the primary ingredient in such descriptions.¹⁵

Nonetheless, the one element which labels Fromm's work as distinctly humanist is his concern about the inauthenticity he perceives in contemporary man. Alienation is therefore a central point of interest for him since he believes that by investigating its nuances man may find the way back to his truly human powers and potentials. At the same time Fromm is also interested in the role of society in bringing about alienation, with an eye towards developing, as his commitment to Marxist principles demonstrates, what he believes to be the basis of an open society which will simply be a public means to individual development, growth, and independence. Thereby he makes the emergence of the man the central theme of his work, and at the same time has linked himself to the one timeless theme of all humanism.

Fromm's views on human emergence do, however, differ fundamentally from those of his predecessor, Sigmund Freud. Since I will deal with this topic extensively later on, it should suffice here to explain that Freud's views are marked by their basic pessimism concerning man's future development. Conflict between man and man, and man and himself will always be an insurmountable obstacle to a better world, says Freud, and for this reason the goals of human self-actualization can never be met. The inhuman side of man, namely aggression, is according to Freud's mechanistic theories a permanent and even necessary companion to man's life-impulses. Any striving for a betterment of the human condition is thus a contradiction in terms, and therefore he did not feel able to 'rise up before my fellow men as a prophet' who could offer them consolation.¹⁶ Psychoanalysis as he conceived of it is at most a palliative. Freud can thus rightly be classed as one of those 'pessimistic humanists' who, upon rationally analysing the situation, has decided to remain gloomy. For this reason too, Freud's self-image always followed along the lines of a dedicated hero-sage, struggling against great difficulties to convince others of the sad truth of the human condition. Because Fromm dissociated himself from Freud's gloomy meta-theories which saw conflict as being intrinsic to human existence, he was able to cast himself in the role of a prophet who at least demonstrated that man has alternatives; indeed,

he labels his own work as 'alternativistic', meaning that it presents man with choices.

A further elaboration on this pessimism was Freud's failure to develop a theory of human growth. It was his belief that a person's development gradually reached a certain stage in adulthood corresponding to an optimum enlargement of the conflicts engendered in him as a child and adolescent. Any human growth was for him merely an enlargement of man's war with himself. By contrast, Fromm's theories take as their central point the ability of human growth to transcend the conflicts and problems which confront man. The difference between the two thinkers rests with their idea of what motivates growth, Freud maintaining that all human motivations are ultimately the desire to rid oneself of unpleasurable tension, while Fromm maintains growth is based on an increase of tension striving for a greater intensity and diversity of human experience. This difference has a definite impact on the course of action a humanist will take. Freudian humanists will seek to reinforce their 'minus' situation (ie., one of low energy and tension), and continually brood over how to come to terms with human fate, while Frommian humanists will consider resolute action as the only way to be fully human (a 'plus' situation of high energy). The latter direction once again enables humanism to become a political matter because it resurrects the individual's faith in his actions to form

a better society. Societal growth thereby becomes an important revolutionary aspect of Frommian humanism, while in Freud's work it merely inflects a single form.

Thirdly, the temporal framework within which a humanist of Freudian persuasion will act is different from that of a Frommian humanist. Both consider time to be kairotic. Chronos is time marked by qualitatively identical intervals, while Kairos is time which has special and decisive significance. Freud considered the past to be of kairotic nature in that it contains the biological origins of man's conflicting instinctual nature and the primal origin of social repression. Fromm believes the future to be kairotic because what is yet to come in the form of human growth will be more important than what has yet transpired. The future is kairotic because it holds the realisation of human potentials and the transcendence of conflict.

III: Human Growth

One of the remarkable phenomena encountered in the history of psychoanalysis is the strange mixture of myth with clinical evidence in psychoanalytical theory. Freud's use of the Oedipus legend and the myth of the killing of the primal father, Jung's appeal to mythology for the interpretation of psychic phenomena, as well as the numerous psychoanalysts who found the parallels between myths and clinical data a topic of irresistible fascination, are well known. The use of myth never disturbed these investigators because their interest centered not around whether myths are accurate accounts of past realities, but rather whether or not they provided elucidating metaphors for the psychic data before them.^{1.}

The reader should therefore not be astonished to find Fromm using the biblical myth of the Garden of Eden as his metaphor for human growth. To Fromm, the myth illustrates the growth of human individuality through the attainment of self-consciousness.*^{2.} Originally Adam and Eve had no consciousness of themselves as individuals

*Meaning literally 'consciousness of self' or awareness of having a self, an awareness of unique characteristics belonging to no one else or no other thing. Hereafter used in this sense.

because of their proximal affiliation with Eden; their primal harmony with their surroundings meant they were a part of its functioning laws.³ Adam and Eve's initiation into knowledge of good and evil signalled their ability to transcend their environment because it gave them the ability to choose alternative patterns of action other than those 'suggested' by their natural surroundings.⁴ Individual consciousness differentiated one's style of life from that of one's surroundings, and marked the beginning of a life of toil and strife.⁵

Human growth also takes place when the new-born infant acquires the ability to transcend its motherly environ and indulges in progressively more autonomous patterns of action.⁶ In its beginning stages a child's individuality is greatly restricted by its instinctual ties to the mother -- at that point the sole sustainer of its existence.⁷ Only with the emergence of an analytic faculty, namely reason, is the child able to plan non-instinctual actions reinforcing its feeling of individuality, and at the same time develop a self-consciousness of doing so.⁸

Human existence begins when the lack of fixation of action by instincts exceeds a certain point; when the adaptation to nature loses its coercive character; when the way to act is no longer fixed by hereditarily given mechanisms.⁹

Yet not unlike the symbolic polarities which characterize the Eden-myth, Fromm introduces two poles of existence into his theory of human growth, the one being primal bondship to the mother or a 'mother-like' environ which restricts a person's frame of action and potentials (like Eden), and the other being the pole of human autonomy and largely free action (land of Adam and Eve's banishment). Throughout his entire life man moves between these two poles because each situation confronts him with the fear of uncertainties he might encounter should he choose a solution of his own free making. According to Fromm the feeling of separateness from both mother and environment is the primal source of all anxiety in man.¹⁰ This basic anxiety at seeking creatively individual solutions to problems is the dynamic factor mediating human existence, each response involving either a regression towards an unindividuated existence, or a new advance towards autonomy.¹¹ "Man wants to progress from night into light and fears at the same time to leave the familiar and to undertake the adventure to step into light."¹²

Persons who do not indulge in the 'adventure to step into light' are in Fromm's theory insane. These persons fear the uncertainties of such an adventure so greatly that they attempt to reproduce the largely unindividuated existence they experienced as children. To give up the ties to its mother a child must establish new ties to the world; insane persons refuse to establish

any new ties to the world, and indulge in an intense narcissism isolating them from any contact with it.¹³

Thereby they experience neither themselves nor the world as 'real', but gain at the same time a safety they feel can be reproduced nowhere else.¹⁴

Human self-consciousness is not however without its problems. Indeed, Fromm calls it a "burdensome curse" which fashions man into the only animal for whom existence is a problem because it imbues life with existential dichotomies.¹⁵ Self-consciousness makes man aware of such dichotomies as, being alone in the universe yet also being a part of it, an awareness of the poles of life and death, of having multiple potentials yet knowing he can never realise them completely, and above all the distance between individual minds which were created when man was separated from nature and his fellow men by his growing individuality.¹⁶ At the same time, because "Self awareness, reason, and imagination disrupt the harmony which characterized animal existence.",¹⁷ man knows that as long as he chooses to retain his individuality he can only allay, not annul, existential dichotomies. For man to live a life apart from instinctual and deterministic laws requires that he develop his reason towards a mastery of nature and himself to better this situation.¹⁸

Nonetheless, Fromm does not naively believe that total liberation from the laws of nature is possible. For this reason he speaks of man as a 'freak of nature' -- who

exists within it, yet transcends it to the extent that his reason and self-awareness enable him to establish patterns of action outside the influence of natural laws.¹⁹ The degree to which he establishes these patterns depends upon his ability to replace his natural (instinctual) ties with inter-human ties called 'society'.²⁰ Two reasons exist for this, the first being the fact that individually developed human potentials are not capable of completely supporting life, and the second being that with the increase in human autonomy comes an increasing anxiety caused by aloneness.²¹

Fromm considers one of the most important components in a society to be work, because it affords a radical change in man's status as an individual. Firstly, it gives proof of his effectiveness as an autonomous agent, and therefore makes him self-conscious of his 'realness'. Secondly, it is a major factor determining his relationship to his fellow men because he must co-operate if he is to make society a viable solution to his status as an anxious, lonely individual. Thirdly, labor affords man a new tie to his natural environ by enabling him to live in it and use its resources, yet also establish a predominantly free style of life.²² Finally, work can offer the hope of increasingly improving man's existence by dissolving historical dichotomies -- problems emerging out of the creation of a society itself. These dichotomies, unlike existential ones which can only be

allayed, result from the use of humanly developed powers and can therefore be erased by those same powers.²³.

"The necessity to find ever-new solutions for the contradictions of his existence, to find ever-higher forms of unity with nature, his fellow men and himself, is the source of all psychic forces which motivate man, of all his passions, affects, and anxieties."²⁴.

Judging by the foregoing, society offers the fulfillment of potentials far larger than any individual could ever hope to attain, and can therefore be considered a further stage in human growth. However, the major import of Erich Fromm's fame as a humanist thinker rests with his descriptions of how society has actually proved to be an impediment to human growth. His major interest has been how social environments can be transformed into authoritarian entities. Fromm puts considerable weight on the aforementioned anxiety human beings experience when they are confronted with new situations that must be overcome during the individuation process, an anxiety which produces the feeling of helplessness.

The feeling of helplessness asserts itself in relation to the person himself. Yes, here perhaps lie its most important consequences for the individual. An appearance of the feeling of helplessness on this level is the helplessness affecting drives and fears. The belief is completely missing that one can even make an attempt to control one's drives or fears.²⁵.

Authoritarian societies seek to reinforce this condition:

The helplessness of the individual is the basic theme of authoritarian philosophy.²⁶

Persons who feel helpless, who have failed to find meaning and direction in life and have fallen into a state of existential doubt which eventually paralyzes their ability to act, will according to Fromm's observations seek to escape their freedom and merge with entities greater than themselves.²⁷ They form the corner-stone of authoritarian societies which rid them of an "... unbearable situation which would make life impossible if it were prolonged".²⁸

Authoritarian societies offer a negative freedom, a freedom from the responsibility to determine the direction of one's existence which Fromm marks as "... the tendency to give up the independence of one's self and to fuse one's self with somebody or something outside oneself in order to acquire the strength that the individual self is lacking."²⁹ A person's positive freedom to actively intervene in conditions facing him, and lead a life of spontaneity and productive relationships, would undermine the existence of an authoritarian society.³⁰ In the case of freedom from, the strengths invested in the individual serve only to make the authoritarian powers more effective and hence more 'real', while in the case of freedom to the strengths of the individual confirm his effectiveness and hence his own

'realness'. Persons who support the freedom from syndrome in effect lead an automaton existence as appendages, instead of being ends in themselves:

The substitution of pseudo acts for original acts of thinking, feeling, and willing, leads eventually to the replacement of the original self by a pseudo self. The original self is the self which is the originator of mental activities. The pseudo self is only an agent who actually represents the role a person is supposed to play but does so under the name of the self.³¹.

Such an escape from freedom, which does not in fact solve the problem of human growth confronting all persons, merely "... assuages an unbearable anxiety and makes life possible by avoiding panic.... and is paid for by a kind of life that often consists only of automatic or compulsive activities."³². A good example of Fromm's is the Nazi regime, which he believes came to power on the heels of persons no longer psychologically able to cope with a world threatening their individuality at every turn, and which created such anxieties as to make it easy for an authoritarian movement to absorb them.³³.

While in a society genuinely devoted towards helping individuals self-actualize work progressively adds to human growth, in authoritarian societies work serves only to guarantee the existence of the authoritarian forces. The products of work become what Fromm calls 'idols', which, although they have been invested with human energy and intelligence, make no positive

contribution to self-actualization.

Man transfers his own passions and qualities to the idol. The more he impoverishes himself, the greater and stronger becomes the idol. The idol is the alienated form of man's experience of himself. In worshipping the idol man worships himself. But this self is a partial limited aspect of man: his intelligence, his physical strength, his power and fame, and so on. By identifying himself with a partial aspect of himself, man limits himself to this aspect; he thus loses his totality as a human being and ceases to grow.³⁴

The essence of authoritarian societies is to keep human powers in a divided state so that individuals pose no threat to its order. For this reason work must be restricted to reflecting the individual's 'realness' in a limited aspect only, contrary to normal conditions where it reflects the holistic individual. Similarly this limited authenticity is reflected in the consumption of pseudo-needs rather than authentic requisites for continued human integrity.³⁵

Fromm's interest in the principles of authoritarian societies led him to investigate the aetiology of the problem. His main conclusions in this area rest on the work of Johann Jacob Bachofen (1815-1887), a 19th century Basel scholar whose efforts concentrated on the problem of ancient matriarchies, and whose major work Mutterrecht und Urreligion (1861) drew heavily on the symbols of antique art and mythology. Many European intellectuals expressed a renewed interest in Bachofen's work in the 1920's,

among them Roger Briffault, who wrote a multi-volume work entitled The Mothers: A Study of the Origins of Sentiments and Institutions (1927) devoted to exploring Bachofen's ideas. Fromm also acquired this interest in Bachofen and eventually wrote a lengthy study of Briffault's work in 1938.³⁶ Most important, Fromm eventually considered Bachofen's work to be authoritatively true, despite its being based on only mythological evidence which Bachofen himself described as expressing 'a forgotten memory of a period of mankind which left us no historical records'.³⁷

It was Bachofen's conclusion that a period of matriarchy had preceeded modern patriarchal societies. These matriarchies, which were overthrown in ancient times, had as their intrinsic quality a social structure favoring freedom, equality, and peaceful relationships between people.³⁸ Fromm's reading of Bachofen stressed the fact that matriarchies were not restrictive of their membership because, "In the matriarchal concept all men are equal, since they are all children of mothers and each one a child of mother earth".³⁹ As in the Eden myth, they stressed ties to the soil, ties of blood, education of the body over that of the intellect, and a passive acceptance of all natural phenomena.⁴⁰ As in the Eden myth also, the positive aspect of matriarchal social orders was their affirmation of life, freedom, and equality, while their negative aspect as the hindrance of

the development of individuality because of ties to soil, blood, and nature.⁴¹

By contrast, patriarchal culture is more remote from close bonds to the environment since it stresses the role of reason and self-consciousness in human existence. It highlights individual autonomy, the isolation of persons from each other, the existence of laws and rational thought, a higher spiritual level than the matriarchal, and the effort to transcend natural phenomena.⁴² By its very nature reason creates priorities in both conceptual and social spheres, which in turn foster the creation of social hierarchies that are intrinsically authoritarian. Fromm concludes reason, discipline, conscience, and individualism to be the positive aspects of patriarchal culture, while social hierarchy, inequality, submission, and oppression are its negative qualities.⁴³

It is Fromm's theory that a truly free society designed to aid the growth of human beings must include elements from both matriarchal and patriarchal social orders. Where the matriarchal society maintains the equality of its members and ensures all persons are given sufficient resources to live, the patriarchal social order allows persons the ability to gain a self-conscious autonomy and self-actualization. Neither of the two can completely aspire to the task because the matriarchal obstructs the ability to individuate, and the patriarchal

is restrictive in whom it grants the sufficient resources to individuate. A humanistic society is thus a means for self actualization in that it makes it easier for persons to survive while actualizing, and fulfills their desire to break away from anxiety and solitude. This dictum, that man is an end and society a means, is in Fromm's estimation central to all humanistic societies. Fromm considers man to be alienated when he is separated from resources and situations which enable him to fulfill his individuating purposes, and when he assumes roles which reflect this separation.

An introduction to Fromm's theory of human growth would be incomplete without examining what he considers to be the two corner-stones of a self-actualizing existence: reason and love.⁴⁴ As I noted in previous pages, it is the manner in which human self-consciousness relates itself to its environment that determines the type of society man creates, and the growth he experiences. Fromm believes man's relatedness to his environment, his fellow man, and mankind as a whole must be tempered with reason and love if he is to successfully realise his highest goals. Both reason and love represent a reaching out, an expanding of human existence, and therefore serve the patriarchal principle of light or day, characterized by the sublimation of human existence over the laws of material life -- the murkiness and spiritual night of matriarchal existence.⁴⁵ Out of the

realisation that a narcissistic isolation from the world is not fruitful in terms of human growth, man turns to seek a new productive relationship with it.

To appreciate how reason can be the basis of a new relationship with the world we must note Fromm's distinction between reason proper, which he defines as the ability to comprehend the world by thought guided by the criterion of truth, and intelligence, which he describes as the ability to manipulate and exploit one's surroundings. He differentiates the ability of reason to picture the objects of its focus in their larger, more holistic context, from the tendency of intelligence to isolate them into the smallest possible perspective because the manipulative function is best served by divisiveness.⁴⁶ Above all, intelligence cultivates an objectivity synonymous with detachment, and therefore merely 'manipulates', whereas reason does not fuse detachment with objectivity.⁴⁷ "Objectivity does not mean detachment, it means respect; that is, the ability not to distort and to falsify things, persons, and oneself. The idea that a lack of interest is a condition for recognizing the truth is fallacious."⁴⁸ In Fromm's world-view man can only grow in a social milieu, meaning a lack of detachment will foster an identification with other persons which makes possible the realisation of potentials that are only the result of a co-operative

effort. For the merely intelligent person both natural and social worlds remain aliens, because he treats them as 'things' reflecting his narcissistic plans of action.

Fromm finds distorted reason to be a characteristic of authoritarian societies when it becomes a part of a general pattern of politics designed to force man into alienated roles. Under conditions of authoritarianism reason becomes the language of manipulation, rather than communication, in that it ceases to transmit images of humanly meaningful quality.⁴⁹ The result is, according to Fromm, a cybernetic, schizoid, monocerebral man whose language no longer reflects his truly human qualities as possibilities, but rather only the fragmentation of his powers which serve an organized domination. Typically, distorted reason substitutes a segmented picture of the world for a holistic one, making it difficult to discern whether social action serves human or authoritarian ends.⁵⁷

Nonetheless, despite reason's ability to forge new links with the world, it does not fulfill the human need for a deeper relatedness with other persons. Fromm considers love to fill this need, a need resulting from the basic loneliness emergent persons feel.⁵² At the immediately personal level love reflects a concern for one's self, a 'self-love' aiming at self-actualization.⁵³ At the level of loving another person it requires care, responsiveness to the other, respect, and knowledge of

the other.^{54.}

At the level of society love is reflected in a society's concern for its members by nurturing their development. Yet whatever level we choose to define it at, Fromm considers love to be the active concern for life and its growth, and for this reason can never become the basis of authority of man over man. Finally, reason and love are equally essential for humans in that the former provides strategies for living in a physical environment, while the latter answers man's need for deeper spiritual commitments.^{55.}

IV: Fromm And Marx

The problems posed by human growth and authoritarianism lead us to consider Fromm's relationship to Marx. Although Fromm is a Marxist, and advocates socialism as the path to a more humanistic world, what interests us here is not a recapitulation of Marxist dogmas. Rather I aim to outline the common ground between Frommian psychoanalytic insights and Marx's work on political economy.

Despite his agreement with Marx on the economic aspects of dehumanization and his crediting Marx with psychological insight, Fromm is quite open about his conviction that Marxism is not a complete theory in the condition which Marx left it. He believes the new knowledge gained from psychoanalysis can add to the economic aspects of Marx's work, and once again make Marxism an effective critique of modern culture. The distinctive feature of Fromm's revision of Marxism is his insistence upon the connection between economic and psychological factors.¹ He believes the forces of production have enslaved man not only in economic terms, but also in psychological and characterological terms. Marx had of course also been aware of this connection,

although in somewhat milder form than Fromm envisaged it: "It is not the consciousness of men that determines their social being, but on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness."² However, the net effect of Marx's acknowledgement of the psychological factor was to leave the matter rest at that stage, and then turn to economics to describe the prisons man fashions around himself in contemporary society. For his part, Fromm has chosen to describe the corresponding psychic prisons.

The earliest and perhaps most representative example of Fromm's combination of Marxist class theory with psychoanalytical ideas is his The Dogma Of Christ (1930). That article analysed the changing ideological stance of the community of Christian believers in the early days of Christianity, by dividing the Jerusalem area into three classes along roughly Marxist lines: upper-class Sadducees, middle-class Pharisees, and lower-class oppressed peasants (a 'Lumpenproletariat').³ Fromm concluded that the dynamic for keeping the lower class in its place was religion, which he described more specifically as a 'psychological vehicle of infantile bondage' imposed on it to cultivate an unconscious dependence upon a father-figure.⁴ The image of God-the-father, identified with the image of the rulers, became the vehicle for an 'infantile docility towards authorities'. At the same time religion offered itself as a palliative for the miserable life of the lower class

making it easier to reconcile itself to the frustrations of life.⁵ Religion also offered the social elite relief from guilt feelings incurred by mistreatment of the lower class.

The decisive factor in this state of affairs was the despair of the lower class: they sought a hero to rescue them from their depressed social status, something they found only in emotional terms in the Christ-image. Conscious hatred was reserved for social authorities while unconscious hatred found its manifestation in the Christ fantasy.⁶ The God-image was balanced by that of a son whose life-history was nothing other than the odyssey of a man attaining God-like stature.⁷ Fromm states that the lower class identification with a son-figure rather than a father-figure, was actually a hidden desire to remove the father from the position of primacy.⁸ The correlation between the wish to destroy the authority of the social elite, with the revolutionary doctrine of replacing God the father with his son, is obvious.

The status of Christianity as an ideology of the lower class was however, reversed in the first century A.D., and reconciled to the aims of the newly emergent state.⁹ As the dogma of Christ developed it came to be identified with the ruling class, thereby eliminating the revolutionary quality of the son-figure; this was reflected in the elimination of any doctrinal hostility

between father and son figures.¹⁰ At the same time a new psychic authoritarianism was practised on the lower class (the Catholic masses), who were offered other psychic palliatives for their lowly existence through such mechanisms as confession, remission of sins, and the ritual of mass.¹¹

Already in this early work Fromm expresses an interest in the relationship between the development of human potentials and authoritarianism. Social classes such as those referred to in his article are the psychic and physical boundaries which define the limits of a person's role differentiation, that is, the extent of the life-styles he can indulge in and the potentials he may realize. By establishing a connection between authoritarianism supported by religious ideology, and the reaction to this authoritarianism by the lower classes in the form of anti-ideologies such as the Christ-fantasy, Fromm has given an account of human strivings to break out of specific role differentiations and assert a broader range of potentials in life. The lower classes attempted to win back powers and abilities that were held in alienation from them. Seen in this light, class struggle is a struggle for the complete realization of the potential growth of human beings.

It is not difficult to demonstrate the confluences between Marx's writings and Fromm's

psychological work, since Fromm has pointed them out in his Marx's Concept Of Man (1961). Both thinkers begin at the same point: they have as their ideal the self-actualizing, or self-creating human being, and proceed to state that the extent of self-actualization depends upon the amount and quality of relatedness man forges with the world.¹² Fromm and Marx consider work as the basic vehicle for this relatedness because it not only mediates between man and nature, it also transforms man himself by expressing new modes of effectualness that reinforce a growing feeling of autonomy and selfhood.¹³ The pattern of work relationships to the world will determine man's consciousness of himself and the extent of his self (as it did in the case of the lower classes of Jerusalem).

Fromm's interpretation of Marx also puts these same ideas in another manner. Marx believed that human alienation is alienation of self-consciousness from an active phenomenal life that would reflect the growth of the total personality. The significance of Marx's thought lies with his analysis of how the social organization of work can block self-consciousness.¹⁴ Because the extent of the self is dependent upon man's experience of himself as an active agent, so social structures can either restrict or enlarge this. Marx clearly recognized this: "The wealthy man is at the same time one who needs a complex of manifestations of life, and whose own

self-realization exists as an inner necessity, a need."¹⁵. Regulation of human growth by restriction of productive activities is the essence of authority. Marx of course produced his famous theories explaining how certain classes hold the products of work for themselves rather than allowing them to reflect the selfhood of the class which produced them. Fromm refined these theories by explaining how authoritarian classes will manipulate the feeling of helplessness many persons experience in the face of a hostile world. The lack of self-consciousness on the part of helpless persons is not only the source of their anxiety, but also the very thing which makes them fit so well into authoritarian situations.

Even though each uses a different analytic approach, Fromm shares Marx's belief that authoritarian societies also manipulate human needs. Again, although Fromm believes Marx never appreciated the psychological complexity of the problem, he does think Marx laid the initial groundwork. He follows Marx's contention that a large part of human manipulation taking place in what is today the most wide-spread of authoritarian systems, capitalism, is the manipulation of needs by the awakening of unhealthy appetites.¹⁶. These unhealthy appetites correspond to the needs of a personality whose shape serves those who exploit it, and whose needs surrender themselves to products, rather than products adjusting

themselves to needs.¹⁷ The sense of having, that is, the frenzy to amass material according to artificial needs, replaces the sense of being, meaning that human worth is measured by its level of consumption, rather than the amount of autonomy and self-realization a person has reached.¹⁸

The sense of having is therefore a negation of the sense of being, a fact which Fromm acknowledges:

Since he experiences himself as a thing, an investment, to be manipulated by himself and by others, he is lacking in a sense of self.¹⁹

Marx spoke of this in similar terms:

Production does not only produce man as a commodity, the human commodity, man in the form of a commodity; in conformity with this situation it produces him as a mentally and physically dehumanized human being.²⁰

Additionally, products become fetishes or idols under such conditions, they increase the capitalist drive to hoard, the drive to have instead of to be.²¹ Because they believe man is not a thing or commodity, Fromm and Marx agree the principal dilemma of modern society is the domination of man by things rather than things by man.²²

An ideal world would look differently for Fromm and Marx. Societies dedicated to human growth, they say, are ones wherein the objects of work become the objectification of man himself -- they reflect and reinforce his individuality.²³ This would create a limit

to the amount of confirmation any potential authoritarian entity could achieve, because they could no longer appropriate the objects of work for themselves. Fromm and Marx are convinced authoritarianism will disappear altogether in a socialist society, the reappropriation of the world and its objects being the essence of any humanist revolution.²⁴ Furthermore, the new socialist society will foster a non-stereotyped existence shunning concentration of human potentials in one direction only, where the pure pleasure of producing will spontaneously induce man to develop potentials in every sphere.²⁵

Finally, both thinkers believe a new relationship to things (objects) will result in a new relationship between persons, because unhealthy appetites and crass materialism will no longer dominate interpersonal relations. Marx writes: "The eye has become a human eye when its object has become a human, social, object, created by man and destined for him."²⁶ Goods and products will cease to be fetishes, and the drive to consume will no longer be the primary goal of life. In its initial stages this will manifest itself in an increased notion of one's truly human qualities, so long hidden by inculcated appetites, and then lead people to perceive others not as mere 'things', but as authentic human beings.²⁷ Like Marx before him, Fromm considers the principles of love and capitalism to be incompatible

because the relationship between persons in capitalist society is one between commodities or things.²⁸ At the same time this newly won notion of our own 'humanness' will result in love relationships which have as their main ingredient an active concern for the integrity and self-actualization of the other person.²⁹ Finally, a reappropriated world of things will also permit love to be felt in relation to the world at large, in the sense that detachment no longer governs perception, rather an involved sympathetic understanding of phenomena.³⁰

V: Character

Fromm's major addition to Marxist theory is beyond the reach of the comparatively simplistic notions which Marx had on such topics as class struggle and dehumanization. His theory of character, which can be said to compose the very essence of Frommian theory, delves into the mechanics of 19th and 20th century domination and how it has evolved from an open authoritarianism, to one working through the subtlest and most unconscious means. What emerges is for Fromm the most ghastly of all forms of human slavery: persons thoroughly dominated and selfless are firmly convinced of their freedom and autonomous authenticity.

"Relatedness" is once again a key concept, since Fromm considers character to be the strategy whereby persons relate to their environment. Loosely defined, character determines the manner in which persons solve the problem of living (the "answer" man gives to questions life asks him), and determines the extent to which a person advances to autonomy and self-consciousness.^{1.} More recently Fromm defined character as the relatively permanent system of non-instinctual strivings through which man relates himself to the world.^{2.} It acts as a

substitute for the lost power of instincts over man, replacing them with semi-permanent energy canalization patterns.³ Indeed, it is the significance of the emergence of self-consciousness that it disrupted the instinctual behaviour patterns of man and made instincts increasingly "trivial" for the purpose of self-actualization.⁴ Moreover Fromm cites neurophysiological evidence indicating the concept of instinct does not mean an exclusion of learning, and has himself conducted studies over the years which suggest the modality and use of instincts is severely influenced by socio-economic conditions.⁵ Character is then actually "social character" -- a label Fromm uses more frequently. This definition is "... based on the consideration that each form of society (or social class) needs to use human energy in the specific manner necessary for the functioning of that particular society."⁶ Each individual exemplifies, insofar as his character structure reflects social norms, the particular approach society has towards the problems and questions existence confronts him with. Insofar as his approach is not the result of social inculcation, it represents the unique personality of the individual himself, and not a "lifeless shadow of cultural patterns to which it adapts itself smoothly."⁷ In any case, whether one chooses to study the role of social, instinctual, or personal factors, Fromm considers the

function of character as being the same: man is an unfinished entity whose character structure provides the patterned tendencies whereby he seeks to complete himself, and decides what types of ideas he will choose and to what extent he seeks to realise them.⁸.

Whereas character can embody self-actualizing tendencies within the context of a humanistic society, it can also become slavish. Social influence can overpower the personal self-determining aspect of character, and amputate or add to character structure those energy channelling tendencies serving authority.

For all irrational and exploitative forms of authority, self-assertion -- the pursuit by another of his real goals -- is the arch sin because it is a threat to the power of authority; the person subjected to it is indoctrinated to believe that the aims of authority are also his, and that obedience offers the optimal chance of fulfilling oneself.⁹.

One of Fromm's best examples is the narcissistic tendencies of persons.

... fostering group narcissism is very inexpensive from the standpoint of the social budget; in fact it costs practically nothing compared with the social expense required to raise the standard of living. Society has only to pay ideologists who formulate slogans that generate social narcissism; indeed, many social functionaries, like school teachers, journalists, ministers and professors participate without being paid, at least with money. They receive their reward from feeling proud and satisfied to be serving such a worthy cause -- and through enhanced prestige and promotion.¹⁰.

Historically speaking, narcissism has been most effectively manipulated towards aggressive and cruel ends in wartime situations, as exemplified by the feeling of "doing the right thing for my country."

According to Fromm's research the major cause of character manipulation is the anxiety which confronts man when he is exposed to the world and must decide either to self-actualize, or shrink from it and attempt to interact with it as little as possible (in Fromm's terms, retreat into insanity, cf. p. 13). In the latter case people seek to fuse with a stronger entity for security, but at the cost of their unique selfhood.¹¹ The paratoxic quality of the substitution of autonomy by heteronomy (where a pseudo self replaces the real self), forces man to experience himself as the sum total of the expectations of others, namely in this case the authoritarian entity.¹² Nonetheless, Fromm feels such replacement of the real self is (despite the fact that this takes place to greater or lesser degrees in all existing societies), only possible in an extremely blatantly authoritarian society. The clash between what is authentic and non-authentic may become accentuated to the point of a neurosis.¹³ Fromm believes that just as in cases of minor neurosis in everyday life, where the neurotic conflict is between the desire to indulge in a certain action or thought and an authority inhibiting this,

so the defeat against the desire to affect an authentic life style in the face of a repressive society may result in a neurosis. Here we have Fromm's archetypal form for virtually all contemporary neuroses. Yet Fromm observed the vast majority of people do not manifest neurotic symptoms despite their loss of freedom, and concluded therefrom that if society in general suffers a loss of freedom, the neurotic conflict is likely to be reified to the level of a socially patterned defect.¹⁴ This defect, contrary to being seen as a "defect", has actually become a virtue valuable to society in that personal self-actualization is sacrificed.¹⁵ At the level of a social norm this defect ceases to produce neurotic symptoms because the clash between two incompatible ideals, that of personal vs authoritarian actualization, is disguised.¹⁶ Fromm considers socially patterned defects the best example of where society has successfully amputated the spontaneous and volitional functions of human character (or never allowed them to develop), and raised them to a level where this amputated character is recognized as being "normal". The true meaning of human alienation as Fromm sees it, becomes apparent as the inability of an amputated character structure to experience its "real self".

But Fromm is realistic enough to know an individual does not decide all at once whether he will self-actualize

or succumb to character amputation. The "decision" is a slow process of years of constant pressure and influence of social forces attempting to mold him. Tragically, for most persons the usual pattern is to surrender completely to social influences and develop a defect considered to be "normal".

Fromm does put forward a typology of various character structures to be found in most contemporary societies, although he is careful to mention that no one structure excludes the other being present to some degree at the same time. What differentiates one orientation from another is the form of relatedness to the world each employs, which in turn determines the form of character.^{17.} There are five non-productive character types whose degree of autonomy, self-consciousness, and growth is virtually nil.^{18.} The receptive orientation is marked by a syndrome of helplessness, and feels the source of all good things to be "outside" itself.^{19.} Affection, love, pleasure, knowledge, and material goods are all things to be "received," which makes these persons dependent upon authorities for all their vital needs and results in a feeling of extreme loneliness when they are without guidance. Exploitative characters differ from receptive ones insofar as they do not expect their needs to be merely passively fulfilled. They judge the world by its usefulness for the purpose of appropriating anything from

ideas and material goods, to love and affection, force and cunning being frequently used for this end.^{20.}

Hoarding orientations are more skeptical of the world "outside" than the receptive or exploitative characters, and for this reason seek to build "walls" in both physical and psychic aspects between themselves and the world. Such persons hoard material goods as well as their feelings and emotions, because to "spend" these is synonymous with a loss of security. Their predominant attitude is that they have only limited physical and psychic resources at their disposal, which can never be replenished once spent.^{21.}

According to Fromm the dominant character type in the twentieth century is the marketing orientation, whose origin he traces to societies which are in essence giant "market places" where values fluctuate greatly. Market characters are rooted in the experience of oneself as a commodity, and one's value as "exchange value".^{22.} Success for them depends upon the ability to "sell" oneself not only in an occupation, but also to friends, strangers, husband, wife, children, regulated by the maxim "I am as you desire me".^{23.}

His presence, status, success, the fact that he is known to others as being a certain person are a substitute for a genuine feeling of identity. This situation makes him utterly dependent upon the way others look at him, and forces him to keep up the role in which he once had become successful.^{24.}

"Necrophilic" is the label Fromm gives to the last non-productive character orientation. Such persons fear the world and their life in it because they believe it to be beyond their control.²⁵ This accounts for their desire to "tear apart living structures" in order to eradicate disorderliness and spontaneity, the only safe world being one which cannot act upon them, namely a "dead" one.²⁶ The fascination with all that is dead, putrid, decayed, and sickly is characteristic of this orientation.

The productive orientation is the only one of its kind, described by Fromm as one striving to realize all the potentials capable of it through the fullest development of human powers.²⁷ Productive characters are marked by creativity and spontaneity in their relations to the world, yet temper these with feelings of care, respect, responsibility and the use of knowledge in their social interactions. Additionally, rationalism is a quality imbued in all their dealings -- a rationalism able to appreciate people and things in a sympathetic, non-detached manner, while not closing the doors to a vision of realistic alternatives and choices.²⁸ A productive character is introspective, even to the point of interpreting his own dreams in order to distinguish his genuine feelings from merely passing or illusory thoughts.²⁹ The interpretation of his unconscious is part of the "enlightenment" a productive character

experiences. Above all Fromm distinguishes the productive character by his ability to love, the key to his relationship with other people and mankind at large and at the same time the basis of his concern to further not only his own unalienated existence, but also that of others.³⁰

Indeed, Fromm believes such persons are sane precisely because of their ability to love in various ways, in contrast to insane persons who fail to relate to the world.

The negative tone of these character descriptions should not lead us to believe such persons are irreversibly locked into their situation, for Fromm would indeed be classed as a humanist of Freud's pessimistic rank if his theory did not allow for the possibility that human beings have the ability to change themselves. Fromm believes all human beings have this capability. Those aspects of themselves which are authentically self-actualizing are hidden in the social unconscious.

The concept of the social unconscious starts out with the notion of the repressive character of society and refers to that specific part of human experience which a given society does not permit to reach awareness; it is that part of humanity in man which the society has estranged from him.³¹

In repressive societies the truly human half of man is unconscious.

The content of the unconscious, then, is neither good nor evil, the rational nor the irrational; it is both; it is all that is human. Consciousness represents social man, the accidental limitations set by the historical situation into which the individual is thrown.³².

Social "filters" are primarily responsible for ensuring the one-dimensionality of human beings. Just as language filters out the reception of certain experiences, so authoritarian societies do not permit the conceptualization or conscious recognition of authentically human qualities by establishing taboos.³³. The mechanism driving this restricted "vocabulary" is the fear of ostracism from society, as well as the resulting loneliness persons feel when they manifest genuinely human, yet socially abnormal, feelings.³⁴. In this situation the socially accepted language continually mystifies persons into conceptualizing their partial personalities to be complete ones.

VI: Bad Faith

It is clear that in Fromm's view mankind suffers from a lack of the courage to "be". Anxiety has suppressed the striving for human growth and restricted the horizon of human potentials to a very one-dimensional scope. This concluding section on Fromm's system will outline the relationship of this courage to "be" with what he calls the "bad faith" of mankind in its own abilities and potentials for life.

Not content to leave the definition of "faith" at the point where it is couched exclusively in religious terms, Fromm extends its meaning to cover various degrees of confidence in one's self. He defines rational faith (or "good faith") as the "certainty of one's own experience and firmness of conviction in the realisation of one's rational vision ...", and that it is "... rooted in the experience of growth, in the active relatedness of man and nature and therefore inseparably linked with the state of activity".¹ This biophilic (or life-affirmative) side of character is motivated by its "attraction to life and joy," and by "strengthening the life-loving side in oneself".² Its most prominent features are a disdain for human submissiveness and a

failure to be impressed by sheer power or force as a solution to human problems.³ Irrational faith (or "bad faith") is found in submissive character types whose failure to be self-actualizing, whose frequent masochistic tendencies, and whose yearning to immerse themselves into a mass of virtually featureless persons to escape anxiety, stands out. In short, Fromm labels the lack of faith in one's self as a form of helplessness.

The man attempting to live without faith becomes sterile, and hopeless to the very core of his being. He must resign himself to clinging desperately to an inner and outer status quo, while finding he has no defense against even the most completely irrational philosophies and doctrines.⁴

Closely related to rational faith is the concept of self-love. Fromm pictures a self-loving person as one who shapes his own life from a position of strength and control over his capacities, and whose growth becomes a "law unto itself" so to speak, seeking the optimal in freedom and happiness.⁵ Such persons can "afford" to affirm the existence of other autonomous beings in their environment since they do not experience them as a threat to themselves. Concisely stated, self-love means "care" for oneself as opposed to the apathy common in non-productive character types who care only for a convenient social role. By contrast the non-self-loving person is the product of a society which cultivates human self-hatred by making it socially unacceptable to be

spontaneous or express one's true emotions. Fromm traces this self-denying ethic to the Calvinist doctrine which states happiness is never a virtue, and inveighs all persons to forego their will for that of an authority.⁶ To Fromm this is merely a form of repression illustrated by the maxim "don't be yourself", "submit your life to something more important than yourself, be it an outside power or an internalization of that power as 'duty'".⁷ Pointing to Max Weber's work, Fromm feels modern capitalism has adopted the Calvinist ethic of human self-denial:

This modern type of man was selfish in a twofold sense: he had little concern for others and he was anxiously concerned with his own advantage. But was this selfishness really a concern for himself as an individual, with all his intellectual and sensual potentialities? Had "he" not become a cog in an economic machine, even if sometimes an important one? Was he not a slave of his machine even if he subjectively felt as if he were following his own orders? Was his selfishness identical with self-love or was it instead rooted in the very lack of it?⁸

Selfishness is a lack of self-love revealing a basically insecure character which places little faith in its potentials and abilities for self-actualization. It is a form of pathological narcissism seeking to protect the person from a threatening world by coming to consider itself as the only reality in it, to which all other forms of life are mere appendages.⁹ "The world outside is not a problem for him with its power, because he has succeeded in being the world, in feeling omniscient and omnipotent."¹⁰ Such narcissism is really based on a

weakness rather than a strength, since it is a character trait which feels control only if it succeeds in keeping a disorderly and uncontrollable world at arm's length by domination.^{11.}

The impotent man, if he has a pistol, a knife, or a strong arm can transcend life by destroying it in others or himself. He thus takes revenge on life for negating itself to him. Compensatory violence is precisely that violence which has its roots in and which compensates for impotence.^{12.}

Frequently narcissism turns to necrophilic domination, the point where faith in one's own life and that of others turns into the desire that all life cease.^{13.}

Still another factor contributing to "bad faith" in the modern world is technological culture. Fromm defines it as "the material world having grown to the proportions of a giant machine determining the direction of human life", where persons function with an "automaton conformity" as helpless "cogs" in a machine.^{14.} These persons are a mixture of receptive and marketing character orientations, symbolically illustrated by the picture of a human "rat" which adjusts its personality to fit the demands of a machine and receives "pellets" as a reward.^{15.} Because society demands they perform tasks emphasizing only a few monotonous skills, persons begin to accept a particular aspect of themselves as their essence, their entirety.^{16.} Moreover, work becomes dedicated to maximizing output and efficiency without

regard for whether or not it meets actual needs or has real goals in mind -- the final result of a society driven to do things simply because it has the capacity to do them.¹⁷ Authentic human feelings begin to recede to the point where, Fromm contends, death is no longer "real". "Death is no longer symbolically expressed by unpleasant smelling feces or corpses. Its symbols are now clean, shining machines; men are not attracted to smelly toilets, but to structures of aluminum and glass."¹⁸

Nevertheless, Fromm maintains hope for mankind -- indeed, he considers hope to be the decisive element in any future social changes towards greater human self-actualization.¹⁹ Hope is the opposite of bad faith in that it reveals an essential confidence in man's attributes to raise himself to a more fully human level. Contrary to being a purely religious factor, hope is set within a rational framework that reveals real possibilities for man based on an assessment of the human condition.²⁰ Moreover, hope is linked to revolutionary fervor and humanistic conscience. A mere rebel is one who desires the overthrow of authority out of simple resentment, but seeks to establish himself as the supreme authority afterwards.²¹ By contrast, the revolutionary character is marked by a consciousness capable of transcending not only his own psyche, but also the narrow limits of his society, and is thereby able to

criticize his or any other social order from the standpoint of reason and humanity because he has succeeded in identifying himself with humanity at large. His disobedience is based on the dictates of a humanistic conscience -- the readiness to listen to the voice of his own humanity in spite of a socially oppressive environment.^{22.}

VII: Fromm and Freud

Looking back on his intellectual development Fromm writes: "Nietzsche said that God was dead; what happened after 1944 was that man was dead."¹ When he received his orthodox Freudian psychoanalytic training in the 1920's, Fromm was impressed by a new technique powerful enough to reveal the hidden causes of this "death" by uncovering the psychic essence of such things as suicide, war, and the tremendous value conflicts inherent in modern society.² This technique formed the basis of his later humanistic formulations above and beyond what Marx wrote about the purely economic side of the human condition. Yet despite the fact that his initial adherence to Freudian orthodoxy resulted from a fervent desire to understand the roots of pathological behaviour, Fromm's increasingly humanist leanings forced him to gradually loosen his ties to the Freudian fold. His understanding of pathology came to be couched more and more in terms of Marxism, Bachofen's matriarchy theories, and a brand of psychoanalysis bereft of mechanism -- all anathema to orthodox Freudianism.

Perhaps the best clue as to the quality of Fromm's humanism and his place in the history of

psychoanalysis is to note his relationship to Sigmund Freud. To be sure, this relationship is negative in its major aspects because the values Freud embraces are in Fromm's view the product of a Weltanschauung hostile to the fully human person, and therefore result in an equally pessimistic and "hostile" theory of the human psyche.³ In the last analysis Fromm's divergence from Freudian orthodoxy originates largely with his view of Freud the man.

The best clue to understanding Fromm's feelings towards Freud (a man he never met) is his book Sigmund Freud's Mission (1959), wherein he expresses his belief that the origin and quality of psychoanalysis is to be found in Freud's personality.⁴ Freud is presented to us in two aspects. The first is a young, basically insecure Freud, who more than anything desired certainty in life, and who in order to relieve his feelings of existential doubt and failure turned to self-knowledge as a weapon with which this misery could be cured.⁵ The other is a Freud characterized by great personal courage, a passion for truth, and a faith in reason exemplified by the Enlightenment motto "sapere aude".⁶ Nonetheless, Freud's basic insecurity never left him, as his fear of travelling alone demonstrates, and which Fromm interprets as a hidden fear of leaving the security of home and the environment of a protective mother.⁷ Additionally, Fromm

cites Freud's poor relationships to women -- seen in his lack of understanding for them, his inhibited sexuality, and the fact that he never mentioned his marriage as a source of happiness.⁸ Already in 1935 Fromm characterized Freud as "hostile" and "Victorian" in his attitudes toward women.⁹ To compensate for his feelings of insecurity, Freud projected an attitude of domination over them, as illustrated by his wish to completely control his wife's life, and his extreme jealousy.¹⁰ Assuming the superiority of the male, and rejecting John Stuart Mill's thoughts on equality for women, he once remarked to a student of his "There must be inequality and the superiority of the men is the lesser of the two evils."¹¹ Fromm concludes from this that Freud made love a "scientific object" and in the process allowed it to become like a pressed flower: dry and sterile.¹²

Freud's feelings of insecurity were partially remedied by his dependence on his disciples, men like Josef Breuer, Wilhelm Fliess, and Carl Jung, who by acting as his trusted lieutenants gave him a feeling of potency that eventually turned into the psychoanalytic movement.¹³ Even this relationship was ambivalent, for although his disciples provided him with comfort, they also caused him to feel uneasy because of his dependency on them, something he came to hate.¹⁴ Often he would break off relations with a disciple and begin hating him,

because he, Freud, desired to be strong himself.¹⁵ The cohesiveness of the psychoanalytic movement came to reflect the vicissitudes of Freud's feelings of security and insecurity.¹⁶ Eventually psychoanalysis became a quasi-political movement complete with party line, and with Freud at its helm pushing for unconditional acceptance of his views.¹⁷ As evidence Fromm cites Freud's shunning of democratic principles within the movement, and his eventual establishment of a secret international committee of seven most trusted associates to watch over the growth of the movement.¹⁸

As early as 1935 Fromm thought Freud's world-picture to be caught in the context of the 19th century middle class.¹⁹ "In fact, his whole psychological system cannot be fully appreciated unless we examine the social philosophy upon which it was built."²⁰ More specifically he summed this up in the following manner:

By non-satisfaction of instinctual desires, so Freud thought, by deprivation, the elite, in contrast to the mob, "saves" psychic capital for cultural achievements. The whole mystery of sublimation which Freud never quite adequately explained, is the mystery of capital formation according to the myth of the 19th century middle class. Just as wealth is the product of saving, culture is the product of instinctual frustration.²¹

In Freud's concept of homo sexualis was hidden an enlarged version of the economists' homo economicus: a basically competitive and aggressive being who treats love like

capital.²² Freud himself had written: "Thus our striving is more concerned with avoiding pain than with creating enjoyment."²³ Neither did Fromm shrink from an even more scathing attack on Freud in 1935 while he was still alive, by calling him a supporter of the ruling class and a classical representative of the patricentric personality, whose temperament sees the essence of life as being the fulfillment of duty and submission to authority, not human happiness.²⁴ Furthermore, because Freud's theory represented the given morality of authoritarianism by the concept of the super-ego, he labelled Freud's system "a psychological vindication of absolute morality".²⁵ Thus while Freud's work represented a major advance in psychology, to Fromm its failure to liberate itself from Freud's personal, social, and political baggage put it politically to the far right of liberalism.²⁶ In Fromm's eyes Freud was now a mere rebel who had never dissolved his dependence upon the authoritarian element, not a true revolutionary keeping hope alive for mankind.²⁷

Perhaps the most basic of all differences between Fromm and Freud concerns the concept of a "self", a term frequently used in the foregoing explanations of Fromm's work. Most immediately evident is the fact that Fromm's theories permit us to speak of a human self alienated from various things such as society, other human selves, or

human potentials, while Freud's model does not permit such conceptualizations. William Barrett and Daniel Yankelovich have explained in their Ego and Instinct why Freud never entertained psychological holism, by pointing to the positivistic heritage within which he had been educated. Ernst Bruecke had been Freud's teacher, a famous Viennese professor of anatomy well known for his dedication to the Helmholtz-Newtonian traditions in physics, and whose guidance at least partially induced Freud to regard the mind as a mere bundle of instincts and intrapsychic conflicts.^{28.}

Following Bruecke, he states that organisms are to be conceived of as systems of small particles moved by forces according to the principle of conservation of energy. The organism is regulated by the principle which keeps the sum of the forces constant.^{29.}

How deeply Freud was committed to the Helmholtz school is shown by his Project for a Scientific Psychology (1895), which he communicated to Fliess. The purpose of the project, he states, is to represent psychical processes as quantitatively determined material particles. "The basic unit, the specifiable material particle, is the neurone, conceived as the building block of the nervous system." The neurone could be either empty or charged with a certain quantity. Neurones tend to rid themselves of these quantities; and, consequently, the entire nervous system endeavours to keep the sum of excitation constant, in accordance with the Newtonian laws of inertia and conservation of energy.^{30.}

This model easily connected with the idea that man is a being composed of mechanically interacting forces, an idea going back to such thinkers as Julien de La Mettrie, Paul Henri Holbach, and Thomas Hobbes; similarly David Hume declared there is no such thing as a human self since man could, when he examined himself, find only isolated and individual perceptions and qualities, but no object called a "self".³¹ While Freud's viewpoint would be adequate for studying the human person from the point of view of his individual components, it could do nothing to account for the whole man. As a result, Barrett and Yankelovich conclude the Freudian psychic model could not yield an adequate explanation of man as he is placed in history and enmeshed in his urgent personal tasks in the world.³² In other words, he could not accommodate a theory of human development in the sense of a developing proprium, only in the sense of a changing bundle of quanta; in the end Newtonian "atomism" won out over Darwinian "evolutionism" because Freud could not conceive of the development of an entire organism.³³

Human mobility and restlessness are blazoned on the pages of history, and it is hard to see how they could be a product of a nervous system whose essential function is to diminish stimuli, and if possible to eliminate them altogether.³⁴

The principle of growth is the principle of the increase of tension, energy, and activity, which is hard to

reconcile with the principle of tension reduction. Small wonder Freud "... had come to regard neurosis as a conflict of instincts rather than a conflict of disagreeable and incompatible ideas concerning the self, something deeper than the clash of a repressed idea with the conscious image of a self ..."³⁵.

The choice between the Newtonian-Helmholtzian and developmental theory posed great problems for Freud's disciples. Some remained firmly orthodox, others attempted a compromise, and still others such as Fromm left orthodoxy altogether. Those attempting compromise, analysts like Heinz Hartmann, Avery Weismann, Erik Erikson, and Anna Freud, turned to "ego psychology" wherein they tried to stress the development of the ego as a form of self. Their attempt, write Barrett and Yankelovich, was as futile as those who tried to graft Heidegger's existentialism (like Ludwig Binswanger) onto Freudian psychoanalysis, because the conflict between physicalism and developmentalism was simply too great.³⁶.

Fromm was too deeply impressed by historical events such as the First World War to adhere to the Freudian model. Concepts such as alienation demand that real human persons be alienated, and not just bundles of neurones and fibers. For this reason Fromm very early loosened himself from the Freudian fold, being more impressed by psychoanalytic method than by Freud's

instinct models. The contrast between Fromm's notion of character and Freud's model of the psyche is also immediately evident in that the former is eminently suited to the evolutionary genre: human character is always in a state of potential growth towards autonomy. Any conflicts that may arise in this model between instincts and the will are only the result of the particular evolutionary stage it finds itself in. Human beings need not regard these conflicts as "natural" since they have the capacity to change the conditions under which they arose. By contrast, Freud thought these conflicts were arranged in a manner according to the demands of innate and unalterable instinctual devices, and therefore man should resign himself to a life of renunciation to minimize their occurrence.

As a humanist Fromm also quite naturally rejects Freud's theory of the innateness of aggression in man, since it would be difficult to justify an optimistic viewpoint on future human development and growth if its necessary concomitant is destruction. All human beings, stated Freud, have an instinct for life as well as one for death, each working to annul the effect of the other. According to Freudian theory aggressiveness is an externalization of the death instinct onto the environment so that its effects on the person himself would be forestalled. Fromm believes Freud upheld this theory for

three reasons. Firstly, Freud was always inclined to think in dualistic terms, and therefore he needed to preserve this dualism in spite of any changes which might occur in his theories.³⁷ Secondly, to abandon the theory of the death instinct would mean not only to abandon dualism, but also to embrace the heresy of his former disciple and defender-turned-enemy, Carl Gustav Jung. Jung had turned to a holistic monism to explain psychic forces, and for Freud to step into the same camp as he was intolerable.³⁸ The third factor concerns Freud's social context. Before 1914 Freud had, like many of his middle-class generation, held an extremely optimistic view of mankind's future, but with the advent of World War One the tremendous human capacity for destruction and violence deeply impressed him.³⁹ His pre-war optimism changed to an almost total pessimism, a pessimism he communicated to Einstein in a letter stating he held no hope for mankind to extricate itself from the grip of aggressive instincts. Curiously enough, the existence of Thanatos and its externalized relative aggression was felt by Freud to be confirmed through personal experience, and actually had a consoling effect on him. Circa 1923 Freud discovered he had cancer of the jaw, provoking attacks of "Todesangst" and a pre-occupation with his own death. Writes Fromm: "To assume that man needs to die because death is the hidden goal of

life might be considered a kind of comfort destined to alleviate his fear of death."* ⁴¹.

Yet Fromm believes there was more than just this to Freud's creation of the dualistic instinct theory. He writes that Freud himself rejected the implications of his theory because it engendered a conflict between Freud the theoretician, and Freud the humanist. The theoretician arrived at the conclusion that man has only the alternative between destroying himself (letting Thanatos do its work) or of destroying others (externalizing Thanatos onto the outside world as aggression). The humanist rebels against this tragic alternative which would make war a rational solution for this dilemma.⁴² Freud had himself, states Fromm, attempted to evade the tragic consequences of his theory by writing in the very same letter to Einstein that the "most obvious plan" to evade war is to bring Eros or the life instinct into play against it. "Anything that encourages the growth of emotional ties between men must operate against war."⁴³ In the very same letter Freud even called himself a pacifist. All this soul-searching is in Fromm's view the result of Freud's adherence to thoughts characteristic of German mechanism, and beyond

*Evidence has recently come to light to confirm this with the publication by Freud's personal physician, Max Schur, of the book Freud: Living And Dying wherein he states the theory of the death instinct literally enabled Freud to live with the reality of his own impending death.⁴⁰

this the vision of man as a machine, so common in the Western world in the past few centuries.^{44.}

We have arrived at the point where it is necessary to delve more deeply into how Fromm turned psychoanalysis into a social psychology based on the belief that man can and must better his condition, instead of remaining with orthodox Freudianism. The following will examine more closely Fromm's rejection of concepts fundamental to Freud's view of society, and through this understand how it is possible that Fromm reconciles Marxism and psychoanalysis. The basis of his humanism has always been decidedly political, as is reflected in his statement that Marxism is a movement of "incomparably greater historic significance" than psychoanalysis, despite his feeling "... somewhat like a pupil and translator of Freud who is attempting to bring out his most important discoveries in order to enrich and deepen them by liberating them from the somewhat narrow libido theory."^{45.} He has remained true to what Blackham calls the "single theme" of humanism, namely self-determination for persons, groups, and mankind in general.^{46.} "Humanism is a teaching, an education in living and an organization of help in practise," ^{47.} states Blackham, based on the dictum "Man is not born human, he becomes human in a society."^{48.}

Phillip Rieff in his The Triumph of the Therapeutic has suggested that cultures are therapeutic in their effects on the individual.

One main clue to the understanding of social organization is to be found in its symbolic or communal purpose; this in turn, operates through a social system enacting that symbolic in a way at once admonitory and consoling. Each culture has its own order of therapy -- a system of moralizing demands, including remissions that ease the pressures of communal purposes.⁴⁹

Properly speaking therapy denotes the alleviation of a disorder, but here it refers to a culture's ability to determine the development of an individual in certain directions. Culturally therapeutic elements are such things as customs, laws, socio-psychological "cues" given to the individual, general ideals a society might hold, etc., all existing for the purpose of inducing the individual to commit himself to a particular social order.⁵⁰

As I mentioned earlier, Fromm's notion of a therapeutic community is based first and foremost on his commitment to Marxist-socialist principles. The therapeutics of Marxist socialism are well-known and we need not delve deeply into them here. The reform of the economic super-structure of a society will free character structure to once again spontaneously realise those values reflecting self-actualization, because forces of

production will serve the potentials of the individual and not the exploiting growth of the economic "machine".

While the guiding structure of a humanistic society is Marxist socialism, Fromm believes its guiding motif will be based on Bachofen's matriarchal concept. A matriarchal society is a true community as opposed to a society, the difference being as Ferdinand Tonnies states, between genuine social bonds and mere aggregations of persons with limited interrelationships.⁵¹ Ludwig Feuerbach, Marx's precursor and a thinker highly respected by Fromm, elaborated further by defining genuine communities as not only composed of persons (Menschen) but also fellow persons (Mitmenschen).⁵² A true community is a "living unity" of men and the concrete expression of their essence, where politics becomes the medium for man's actualization.⁵³ Simultaneously such communities will allow and even intrinsically promote every "I" to be complemented through a loving relationship with a "Thou", an important factor since Fromm considers isolated self-actualization to be limited to a small portion of the potentials available. This is the true meaning of Fromm's statement that "love is the only satisfactory answer to the problem of human existence": singular self-actualization reflects the fragmentation of the community.⁵⁴

However Fromm also identified the Marxist genre as specifically matriarchal by noting Marx's cognizance of Bachofen's work: "Bachofen was first discovered and extolled by the socialist camp -- by Marx, Engels, Bebel, and others."⁵⁵ "... in terms of psycho-social foundations, the patriarchal social structure is closely bound up with the class structure of present day society."⁵⁶ He decisively identified Marxism as the only form of social organization capable of ameliorating the material world to fulfill the needs of self-actualizing human beings. "The psychic basis of the Marxist socialist program was the predominantly matricentric complex."⁵⁷

This identification also marked the negation of the Oedipus complex as an important factor in social relations, one of the most sacred of all Freudian concepts. In doing so Fromm eliminated the need to see society as necessarily patricentric and authoritarian. Freud saw the principle behind the Oedipus complex to be fear of the father, and at the larger social level this fear of the father is fear of the father-*imago* in the form of authorities. The Oedipus complex is a decisive point in a person's life because its overcoming, i.e., the relinquishing of the wish to possess the mother because of the father's authority, marked the birth of the super-ego (or conscience); at the larger social level this

super-ego becomes identified with all the prohibitions and rules a culture creates, and according to Freud remains identified with the father image. Fromm considers this dominance of the father image in social relations to be erroneous and proceeds to demonstrate this by reinterpreting the Oedipus myth. There was never, he states, any mention of erotic desires by the son for his mother in the Oedipus play.⁵⁸ Rather it centers around the struggle for political authority between Oedipus, Haemon, and Antigone who are symbols of the matriarchal principle because they attack the social and religious order, and the tyrannical Laius and Creon.⁵⁹ What Freud failed to see because of his male bias (cf. our discussion of Freud's personality) was that the mother imago is also symbolic of material life sustaining qualities and not necessarily (indeed rarely according to Fromm) of purely sexual attractions.⁶⁰ Similarly this blinded Freud from seeing the importance of the feminine motif in society. Because Freud took his interpretation of the Oedipus myth as prototypal for all social orders he had to posit the basis of society as being authority.

Freud also "locked" his patriarchal interpretation of social relations into a rigid instinct theory, and thereby precluded any hope of an ameliorated human race. Chapter six of Civilization and Its Discontents trenchantly outlines why society cannot function without constantly

keeping aggressiveness authoritatively in check. As we recall, aggressiveness is the result of the death instinct diverted onto the outer world instead of having it act on the individual himself.⁶¹ Civilization endeavours to restrict this otherwise rampant aggression at the cost of individual happiness, since externalized aggression is now redirected back to the individual through the mechanism of repression. This repression remains a permanent part of the individual in that it becomes manifest in the super-ego or conscience which threatens the individual with sanctions and guilt should he even think about satisfying his innermost desires. "Civilization therefore, obtains mastery over the individual's dangerous desire for aggression by weakening and disarming it and setting up an agency within him to watch over it, like a garrison in a conquered city."⁶² In Freud's eyes society is doomed to an eternal tension between its citizens and its powers of authority for if the relationship between life and death instincts is locked into a mechanistic framework, then their effects on the level of social interaction can neither change. Certainly he never believed the power of ethics would be of any avail:

The commandment, "Love thy neighbor as thyself," is the strongest defense against human aggressiveness and an excellent example of the psychological proceedings of the cultural super-ego. The commandment is impossible to fulfill;

such an enormous inflation of love
can only lower its value and not get
rid of the difficulty.⁶³

At the same time we can detect Freud's insistence on the individual as the only standard of happiness, as if a dispersion of values such as love only debases them, whereas in Fromm's view values must be dispersed in order for humanism to flourish. It is also reminiscent of Freud's Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, wherein he describes the mechanics of social groups in pejorative analogies reflecting his belief that mass values are essentially empty values.

Social interest is not then something Freud considers to be an innate factor in man. As Adler defines it, social interest is the human "feeling with the whole", to strive for an ideal community.⁶⁴

Interestingly enough Freud's views match those of Thomas Hobbes in that both thought social interest must be forced on persons.⁶⁵ Both begin with the assumption of an essential continuity between the psychology of the individual and the vicissitudes of politics, and both base their theory of social relations on the psychology of the aggressive individual.⁶⁶ Hobbes had seen the perpetual desire for power as the dominant factor in human existence and hence the sovereign's task was to keep this in check lest it produce conditions of wholesale anarchy and destruction.⁶⁷ There is a striking

similarity between Hobbes' description of human beings creating commonwealths for protection and regulation of life under the guidance of a strong sovereign, and Freud's statement that "Human life in common is only made possible when a majority comes together which is stronger than any separate individuals and which remains united against all separate individuals."⁶⁸ Finally, both Hobbes and Freud think of the psychology of masses in terms of submissiveness, meaning social interest is largely based on punishment or the threat of punishment. Freud writes:

Ethics is thus to be regarded as a therapeutic attempt -- as an endeavour to achieve, by means of a command of the super-ego, something which so far has not been achieved by means of any other cultural activities.⁶⁹

Social amelioration has within the Freudian framework been reduced to coercion.

The significance of Fromm's rejection of Freudian mechanism and its instinctual theory was to enable him to consider the possibility of a non-repressive social order. Because of its Newtonian basis Freud's paradigm precluded the reconciliation of psychic components and forces into a general confluence called a "self", since a Newtonian engine either "stays put" or "wears out", but never "grows up".⁷⁰ Additionally, Fromm refused to consider the main forces in social reform as being necessarily repressive forces. Freud saw

the individual's conscience as a punishing force while Fromm emphasized it also had matricentric qualities of love and forgiveness.⁷¹ An individual needs to forgive himself as well as others if conscience is to act amelioratively; a healthy conscience is in Fromm's view one containing both the fatherly "this you ought to do" and motherly love and forgiveness.⁷² The real danger to the self-actualizing human being is that unrestricted self-punishment will rob him of his strength to return to a path of authenticity. The principle of law in an ideal society must as Fromm states, be to aid the person to become a "master of the return" -- to become one who is able to return to his true self after having gone astray.⁷³

Freud's contention that a non-repressive society is an impossibility was also reflected in his views on psychotherapy, and offers another major point of distinction from Fromm's theories. The basic difference between the two lies with Freud's refusal to allow psychoanalysis to be a medium for ethical categories of the type Frommian humanism counts as its building stones. Several writers have remarked on this matter, among them Heinz Hartmann, Lewis Feuer, and Phillip Rieff, all of whom agree that Freud never identified with a specific moral system nor that he built into psychoanalysis any criteria for telling what is "good" or "moral"

(philosophically speaking, to tell "ought" from "is"). Hartmann's Psychoanalysis and Moral Values bases itself on Freud's statement "What is moral is self-evident,"⁷⁴ while Feuer's Psychoanalysis and Ethics tells us the capabilities of analytic method do not go beyond being able to tell us what psychic states correspond to certain moral or ethical ideals.⁷⁵ It is however on Rieff's more erudite and complete work that I will base my following remarks.

In Civilization and Its Discontents Freud argued that freedom is not a product of society, but was greatest prior to it when instinctual drives could run rampant.⁷⁶ He believed the desire for freedom to be directed against society, not through its various mediums for living.⁷⁷ Yet because he thought society to be a necessity he was also convinced the most human beings can do is strive for a modicum of happiness under existing conditions. "Happiness, in the reduced sense in which we recognize it as possible, is a problem of the economics of the individual's libido."⁷⁸ In other words, if the psychic apparatus cannot give birth to a society which will facilitate genuine human gratification, the most psychoanalysts can do is ensure the economics of the libido*

*Freud's term for the energies connected with the life instincts (Eros).

is in smooth running order. This provides for a limited inner freedom to achieve happiness, but still does not mean freedom can be extended to the general social level, as Rieff illustrates:

Even in an atmosphere of conformity, inner freedom is possible. Freedom is no more than a metaphor, for Freud, when applied to any form of society; it can properly be said to exist only within a person when there is a right balance among parts of the psyche. The quest for social freedom is superficial, indeed a contradiction in terms.⁷⁹

The aim of psychotherapy can thus be summed up in the following manner:

The therapeutic effort aims at reserving energies for everyday life instead of having them frittered away in neurosis -- or in analysis itself. Therapy prepares a mixture of detachment and forbearance, a stoic rationality of the kind Epictetus preached.⁸⁰

Ironically Freud had already anticipated this view ca. 1885 after seeing a performance of the opera Carmen: "Thus our striving is more concerned with avoiding pain than with creating enjoyment."⁸¹ If, as Freud thought, society's moral imperatives are the impediment and not the solution to the problem of human gratification, there was no reason to further the patient's misery with even more moral prescriptions.⁸²

In the absence of news about a stable and governing order anywhere, theory becomes actively concerned with mitigating the daily miseries of living rather than with a therapy of commitment to some healing doctrine of the universe.⁸³

Freudian psychoanalysis is truly an analysis, not an exhortation to commitment, and therefore can only inform, not transform.⁸⁴ Its capabilities do not go beyond cultivating detached involvement in a person, "the ethic of a pilgrim who became a tourist".*⁸⁵ Fromm of course takes exactly the opposite route by asserting the successful realization of moral values in a socialist-humanist context will liberate the patient, and that a passionate involvement in social life is the only answer to the contradictions of existence.

The fact that Freudian psychotherapy carries with it nihilist implications is amply demonstrated in Rieff's The Triumph of the Therapeutic, which describes how the "psychologizing" that resulted from the hermeneutic techniques of analytic practice hunts down all settled convictions and demonstrates them to be the

*It is interesting to note that Fromm thinks he was hardly influenced by Nietzsche.⁸⁶ Marx never went beyond Hegel's notion of the organic community where a person becomes truly human in and through that community. The existentialist tradition has never made significant room for the concept of community in its writings. Because he declared the downfall of absolute morality, and was therefore unable to believe that an individual could fulfill himself in and through a community, Nietzsche rejected Hegel's and Marx's notions of community. Nietzsche's concept of self-overcoming refers to personal and not communal ideals. Seen from Freud's standpoint (he agrees with the sentiment of Nietzsche's work), Fromm harks back to an anachronistic era in the history of thought.

result of a wide range of personality structures.^{87.}

"By psychologizing about themselves interminably Western men are learning to use their internality against the primacy of any particular organization of personality."^{88.} The validity of healing doctrines thus becomes relativized. Already in the 1930's Fromm was aware of precisely the problem Rieff just posed. Noting Freud's refusal to make psychoanalysis into a technique committed to a particular set of ethical standards, Fromm began to attack the tacit values he represented by comparing the non-commitment of Freudian analysis, to the ideal of tolerance contained in the history of bourgeois culture. As it was originally formulated in the 18th century the idea of pure tolerance was a result of the battle against repression practised by absolute states.^{89.} The victory of bourgeois culture meant tolerance shifted towards a total relativism of values, tolerance becoming synonymous with moral laissez faire. In actuality this tolerance was limited to the point at which it permitted attacks on the existing social order;^{90.} tolerance was a consciously accepted virtue, but it unconsciously ended where the rules of the prevailing social order began.^{91.} Liberalistic tolerance was a significant factor at the level of thought and speech, not however when it came to trade and economic relationships in society.^{92.} Psychoanalysis as an expression of bourgeois tolerance

was therefore subject to these very same shortcomings, since by advocating tolerance on the level of thought and speech, but still tacitly refusing to consider any change in the social order as significant to the human psyche, it tacitly supported the given status quo.⁹³ As Rieff puts it, psychoanalysis in Freud's hands could offer no more reason to rebel than to be obedient.⁹⁴ Fromm thus accuses orthodox Freudianism of supporting repression and human misery by default. Strangely enough, however, Fromm recently maintained he never left Freudianism, unless one identifies Freud with his mechanism, and he even points out his present membership in the Washington Psychoanalytic Association, which is Freudian.⁹⁵ The source of this apparent contradiction results from Fromm's identification of himself with analytic method, not with Freud's combination of metapsychology and method. By doing so he was later able to call Freud a great "enlightener" of humanity in the same league with Marx.

Other analysts were also attacked by Fromm for either tacitly supporting repressive social orders or for directing the patient's commitment into the "wrong" directions. Otto Rank was attacked for supporting what Fromm thought were his fascist ideals, and Carl Jung for an individualism which precluded any real salvation on a community basis. In the former case Fromm wrote an

article in 1939 on Rank's therapeutic techniques centering around Rank's emphasis on the patient's ability to live with his illusions and Rank's ethical relativism as expressed in the dictum "What I will is true, that is, what I make truth."⁹⁶ Fascists in Italy and Germany also stressed relativism of truth in order to manipulate people into ideologies supporting the power elite, and therefore in Fromm's view Rank was ignoring his responsibility to mankind.

Carl Jung received heavier criticism than Otto Rank, some of it unmistakably personal, even though Fromm had only heard Jung lecture a few times and Jung had never mentioned him in his conversations nor attached any importance whatsoever to his work.⁹⁷ Fromm described Jung as a "romantic obscurantist", as a man in whom darkness had won over rational tendencies, as producing fantasies and visions, and as a man who essentially eliminated the core of psychoanalysis (namely the search for truth) and replaced it with a "meretricious spirituality and brilliant obscurantism". He attacked Jung personally as a basically lonely, insecure man who in his search for certainty in life was led to take his extremely vivid imagination as being "real", and to finally deify it. Furthermore, Fromm makes much of Jung's view that the psychologist's task is not so much to analyse whether something is true or not, but what the

existence of any given psychic contents means for the behaviour of the person. The ultimate outcome of Jung's confusion of his unconscious fantasies with reality was a corresponding diminishment of knowledge about himself. "The more Jung persuaded himself about the reality of his visions, the less he knew about himself."⁹⁸ Eventually Jung's character became necrophilious because of the deep affirmation he gave to his unconscious -- marked as it was by images of death, destruction, blood, corpses, and murder -- and transferred itself onto the conscious character of this man. He had to fight hard, states Fromm, to separate the two, but when this failed he acquired a "lively interest in the powers of darkness". The gist of Fromm's attack was a disapproval of the direction Jungian therapy takes: it seeks individual "salvation" via intense contacts with unconscious material, and makes the person's relationship to that material the basis of his self-development, thus ignoring any commitments to an "enlightened society" or a better arrangement of the forces of economic production.

VIII: Psychotherapy As Humanist Action

In light of his emphasis on social change it comes as somewhat of a surprise to hear Fromm say: "While I have been passionately interested in politics since the age of eleven or twelve (when I talked politics with a socialist who worked in my father's business) to this day, I have also known that I was temperamentally not suited for political activity."¹ His activity has always been in the area of analysing and investigating rather than being an outright practical revolutionary concerned with the day-to-day leadership of movements. Fromm's contribution to political change is limited to the practise of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy itself. As early as 1931 he wrote in an article entitled Politics and Psychoanalysis:

... so perhaps it may not be unjustified to expect, that psychoanalysis can also prove itself to be a type of political-social therapy. One could perhaps rightly expect, that society would give up all useless activities, if one could succeed to make it conscious of the unconscious, irrational essence of these activities.²

Since however, as a Marxist he would not go against the dictum that political action must pass the final judgment on society, he warned that we should not harbor any

illusions of using psychoanalysis as a replacement for politics.³

Looking back, Fromm sees psychoanalysis as a Western response to the universal spiritual crisis of man.⁴ Initially it offered a solution to at least some of man's problems, but it rapidly turned from a radical to a conformist theory, losing its original character by failing to respond to the altered human condition after World War One. "... instead it retreated into conformism and the search for respectability."⁵ Some of the blame for the stagnation of psychoanalytic theory rests with Freud's orthodox disciples, whom Fromm attacks as being "yes-men" to Freud who found greater security and social respect in the tightly knit circle around Freud, than in radical departures from him.⁶ In the long run Fromm considers the only two alternatives for psychoanalysis to be either slow decay or creative renewal. "... the creative renewal of psychoanalysis is possible only if it overcomes its positivistic conformism and becomes again a critical and challenging theory in the spirit of radical humanism."⁷ A revised psychoanalysis "... will be critical of all social arrangements that warp and deform man, and it will be concerned with processes that could lead to the adaptation of society to the needs of man, rather than man's adaptation to society."⁸ Fromm does not believe this will take place unless

psychoanalysis merges with the goals of an active optimistic humanism and a more radical relationship between the analyst and his patients.

Perhaps the best description of the aims and methods of Fromm's psychoanalytic technique comes from his article Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis (1960) wherein he compares the Zen ideal of egolessness with the psychoanalytic search for the "authentic" self. In Zen, ego is identified with all those components of character that are not the authentic self. Similarly, for Fromm ego is the alienated character structure man confuses with his authentic self, and when psychoanalysis aims to restore the well-being of a person, it aims to induce him to drop the project of aggrandizing the ego, or false (non-productive) character structure society finds useful.⁹ The ego begins to break up when a person overcomes the narcissism which encapsulates consciousness of his true potentials.

Well-being is possible only to the degree to which one has overcome one's narcissism; to the degree to which one is open, responsive, sensitive, awake, empty (in the Zen sense).^{* 10}.

Psychoanalysis endeavours to open the individual to new perceptions and possibilities by destroying this narcissism.¹¹ The essence of the therapeutic task is to

^{*}"Empty" means in the Zen "empty of false and inauthentic thoughts".

remove the social "filter" from influence in the patient's life. Fromm defines this "filter" in the following manner: "Every society, by its own practice of living and by the mode of relatedness, of feeling, and perceiving, develops a system of categories which determines the forms of awareness."¹². In other words, the language and logic a society attempts to make normative controls a person's manner of experiencing the world, because the range of conceptualization determines the modality of potential life-styles.¹³.

Assuming that consciousness (or ego) is largely fictional -- that is, built of components not reflecting the real self -- the psychoanalyst must appeal to the patient's unconscious in order to rescue what is authentic to him.¹⁴. The unconscious is akin to what Dostoevsky called the "underground man", leading a secret life that waits to break through the restrictive ordinances of society.

Formally speaking, then, what is unconscious and what is conscious depends on the structure of society and on the patterns of feelings and thoughts it produces. As to the contents of the unconscious, no generalization is possible. But one statement can be made: it always represents the whole man, with all his potentialities for dark and light.¹⁵.

The unconscious is the whole man, minus that part of man which corresponds to his society.¹⁶.

Inasmuch as the psychotherapist desires to raise what is truly human out of the unconscious, he wants the person to identify with himself, and not his socially inculcated self-image. At the same time, the liberation of the unconscious will open the patient not only to his individual uniqueness, but also to those human qualities he shares with all mankind (the social unconscious we spoke of earlier).¹⁷ "Making the unconscious conscious transforms the mere idea of the universality of man into the living experience of this universality; it is the experimental realisation of humanism."¹⁸

To sum up this general idea we can note that Fromm does follow Freud's original aim to psychotherapy, namely to educate the person to the truth of his own psychic situation. Like Freud, Fromm believes knowledge leads to transformation -- to know oneself is to transform oneself.¹⁹ Nonetheless, all too often mere intellectual self-knowledge replaces an affective, actually transformative, knowledge, because the person, or in our case the patient, is encouraged to think in a detached scientific manner.²⁰ The quality of intellectual self-knowledge and true self-knowledge are thus distinctly separate as Fromm makes clear: "Discovering one's unconscious is, precisely, not an intellectual act, but an affective experience, which can hardly be put into words, if at all."²¹ "There is usually a good deal of

anxiety aroused before the experience takes place, while afterwards a new feeling of strength and certainty is present."²².

When playing his proper part, the analyst is a guide who "... must take away one rationalisation after another, one crutch after another, until the patient cannot escape any longer, and instead breaks through the fictions which fill his mind and experiences reality -- that is, becomes conscious of something he was not conscious of before."²³. Now too the analyst must cease to be "scientifically detached" and act as a participant-observer in the process of his patient's psychic transformation.²⁴.

The knowledge of another person requires being inside of him, to be him. The analyst understands the patient only inasmuch as he experiences himself all that the patient experiences.... In this productive relatedness between analyst and patient, in the act of being fully engaged with the patient, in being fully open and responsive to him, as it were, in this center-to-center relatedness, lies one of the essential conditions for psychoanalytic understanding and cure. The analyst himself must become the patient, yet he must be himself; he must forget he is a doctor, yet he must be aware of it. Only when he accepts this paradox, can he give interpretations that carry authority because they are rooted in his own experience.²⁵.

Still, the analyst's identification with the patient would not necessarily have the effect of awakening him to the presence of a latent self, were it not for the

fact that the analyst himself must know what it means to discover one's authenticity under layers of ego, and from his own experience know what steps to enact in his encounter with the patient.²⁶ Fromm criticizes contemporary psychotherapy for not appreciating this because it is itself involved in the alienative process. Psychotherapy fits so well into the social system because, being based on non-holistic premises that consider man to be the mere sum total of many parts, it agrees with the social fragmentation of the patient's self-experience.²⁷

This dissolution of parataxisms, that is, the discrimination of what is authentic from alienated in persons, is thus the very heart of Fromm's conception of psychotherapy. "It can undo one illusion after another, and thus free the way to the decisive act which alone we can perform: the "courage to be", the jump, the act of ultimate commitment."²⁸ The pattern of authenticity emerges in an almost mystical way, as Fromm describes. "The final understanding cannot be fully expressed in words; it is not an interpretation, which describes the patient as an object with various defects, and explains their genesis, but it is an intuitive grasp. It takes place first in the analyst and then, if the analysis is to be successful, in the patient. The grasp is sudden; it is an intuitive act which can be prepared by many

cerebral insights but can never be replaced by them."²⁹. This "grasp" goes on to manifest itself in the patient's life in the following three directions:

1. to be related to the world and one's fellow man, yet retain freedom and personal integrity; specifically, to form a new relatedness to the world; to have the ability to love.

2. to be creative; the act of creation enables man to transcend his environment and be truly free to self-actualize; he is no longer bound by laws of nature. Creativity offers proof that one "is". "I am because I effect."

3. to have a "frame of orientation and devotion; a map of the social and natural world according to which one can act and accept as a frame of reference for one's life." A Westanschauung roots man's existence in something beyond a person's egocentricity.³⁰.

To be sure, although Fromm places great importance on the fulfillment of these factors, he does not propose the specific manner in which they are to be fulfilled.

The openness with which Fromm believes the entire analytic situation must be conducted should be briefly mentioned since it gives us a preliminary view of the essential part of the entire process, the "meeting" between patient and analyst. As is well known, Freudian therapy was conducted under rigid conditions where the

patient and analyst did not look at each other, and where the analyst is placed in an implicitly superior position above and behind the patient. By contrast one of Fromm's patients described the situation as follows. His office was a book-lined room with large windows; "I chose a place, and he would sit opposite me. In the beginning I was rather awed by his reputation, but his is a deeply outreaching personality. Sometimes, during an anxious period, he would just listen intently, maybe say a little more than this was an area which needed to come out. Or when I had run dry due to repressions, repressions, etc., he would talk, illuminate. Once after a long painful experience he absolutely horrified me by coming outright: 'Jesus Christ, that's bull-shit. I never heard of so many bastards in my life.' When he saw my shock we both broke into laughter."³¹ At other times, this patient would be sitting in his desk while Fromm sat by its side. Other sources say he was irritable with mere verbiage that did not represent the patient speaking from within himself. Periodically he would take stock of the analysis by confronting the patient with the dilemma of either coming to grips with his situation or terminating analysis (usually after 2-1/2 years); this would prevent therapeutic collusions between patient and analyst that support emotional dependencies. Lastly, he was especially adept at

treating the neurotic, well-defined patient whom he could easily confront with new constructive experiences after breaking down their defenses.³².

Assuming, as I have demonstrated, that identification with the patient's situation is the essential part of Frommian therapy, and the dissolution of a parataxism between alienated (non-productive) character and authentic character is the goal, then the very humanist nature of the analytic situation lies in the encounter, in the act of meeting. The encounter itself will be the decisive act whereby persons re-appropriate themselves as sovereign beings. Because the origins of the patient's problems lie with social factors the analytic situation cannot divorce itself from a social consciousness; analysis does not take place in a vacuum and neither is it politically neutral. On the contrary, Fromm considers analysis as going against the social "grain". The analyst does not leave the social climate intact when he treats a patient. Unlike Freud, Fromm thinks the analyst cannot leave the moral demands of the socially controlled super-ego intact and thereby tacitly support the social order which caused the patient's problem.³³. Already in 1936 Fromm made it clear he thought the political views of the analyst are decisive because they will greatly determine the outcome of therapy³⁴. -- meaning to build up the patient's autonomy in the name of authentic

values and goals is more often than not to accentuate the difference between the person and his alienating society. In a society dependent on illusions for its smooth functioning, truth is of revolutionary proportions. Psychoanalysts must therefore be revolutionary characters and identify with what is authentically human in all mankind.³⁵

How, specifically, the analyst is a prophet must be explained by an appeal to what Fromm calls radical Jewish humanism. In his You Shall Be As Gods (1966) he remarks that in the Jewish tradition a person's "salvation" is dependent on how he copes with his earthly existence (especially how he cooperates with others) as a means of transforming himself. The Jewish prophet was a "roeh" or "seer" and later a "spokesman" and "speaker" not because he could divine the future, but because he perceived what forces operate in the world now, and their consequences. He always expressed prophecies in terms of alternatives, leaving room for free will and decision to intervene in human fate.³⁶ The psychoanalyst is a prophet because he too functions as a seer who discerns the forces involved in human fate (psychic forces in this case). His prophecies, based on insights into the patient, make clear the implications of the person's present character structure for the future, but are always careful to express alternate

styles of life and character he may assume. This demonstration of alternatives to the patient bases itself on the real possibilities available to him, meaning the patient should not be led to believe he is absolutely free. Fromm's reading of Marx, Spinoza and Freud made him realise that man is born into a specific situation exercising control over him from which he may free himself by his own efforts, but his freedom is always limited to earthly possibilities.³⁷

The second similarity between prophet and analyst is manifest in the Jewish prophet's attempts to awaken his people to the real situation with which they are confronted by dispelling the illusion they harbor. Fromm considers the analyst to play the same role, as demonstrated by his statement of 1931:

In that psychoanalysis is suited, as a theory, to explain genetically certain socially relevant illusions, and to destroy them, it can attain a political function in certain social situations, and thereby become the starting point for a rejection of those illusions by social institutions and its scientific servants.³⁸

All great men of history, states Fromm, have been ones who freed man from the "chains of illusion" preventing his growth towards freedom. Notably he includes Freud in this group. Yet it is easy to see why he could never be an orthodox Freudian, for this would have entailed his belief in a form of illusion itself: Freud's

mechanistic instinct theories. Paradoxically, for Fromm psychoanalytic method provided the tools for its own self-overcoming, something Freud never realised.

Strangely enough, according to Fromm the patient also helps dispel the analyst's illusions. Because communication is reciprocal the analyst not only cures the patient, but is also cured by him.³⁹ "The analyst analyses the patient, but the patient also analyses the analyst, because the analyst, by sharing the unconscious of his patient, cannot help clarifying his own unconscious."⁴⁰ The patient elucidates the analyst's own situation by showing what it is to be human in the present social environment. Fromm believes the analyst must overcome his own alienation and inauthenticities, and therefore the analysis of the analyst is only the beginning of a continuous process of self-enlightenment.⁴¹

Paul Roazen's Brother Animal: The Story of Freud and Tausk confronts us with a picture of Freud's personal analytic techniques based on rather startling premises compared to Fromm.

Freud was not an old-fashioned physician with a need to cure. He was no lover of mankind. He wrote of his "disappointment in human beings". The older Freud became, the more what he called his indifference to the world came out. "In the depths of my heart I can't help being convinced that my dear fellowmen, with a few exceptions, are worthless.... I have found little that is 'good' about human beings on the whole. In my experience most of them are trash."⁴²

Similarly, Freud grouped psychotics, delinquents, addicts, and "perverts" in the class of persons not worthy of analysis;⁴³ by contrast Fromm's humanism assumes all human beings are potentially "redeemable". Small wonder Freud never advocated the analyst should identify himself with the patient's situation. Could it be he thought the identification with the patient would lower the analyst to the level of a lesser species of human being? Perhaps Phillip Rieff has found at least a partial answer to this view so diametrically opposed to everything Fromm stands for: "... he (Freud) was led to ordain a quasi-elite (the analysts) able to read the dreams of others (the patients) while they themselves, like Calvinist saints who are still human and are therefore sinners, undergo regular scrutiny at one another's hands as patients."⁴⁴

IX: Fromm And Prophecy

To write a chapter on Fromm and prophecy is not inappropriate considering the tendency of innovators in the field of psychology and psychoanalysis to cast themselves, consciously or unconsciously, into the mold of heroes and prophets. The three most prominent examples of this are Freud, Adler, and Jung. Freud saw himself as a Byronic hero struggling against great difficulties; Adler, although shunning the conscious behaviour of the sage, nonetheless thought of himself as an apostle of an idea in which lay the salvation of the world; and Jung eventually identified himself with the 'almost legendary figure of the old wise man of Kuesnacht', as if he had taken on the imago of the old wise man archetype he himself had articulated in his books.¹ It is impossible to ignore the tremendous tensions in Fromm's work between the statements of 'fact' he makes about the present human condition, and the great possibilities mankind can realize in the future, a tension that can only be explained in human terms as the conviction by a creative thinker that he is being objectively prophetic. Likewise this tension is found in the Jewish tradition of the prophet, as well as in

Marx's forecasts on impending world revolution, as in the work of Fromm's teacher Alfred Weber, and as in the Frankfurt School of Social Research to which Fromm belonged.

To begin with, Fromm's prophesying continues a trend first initiated in the nineteenth century, and therefore when investigators turn to Fromm's place in intellectual history as a whole, it will be impossible to consider his endeavours as an isolated phenomenon. Briefly stated, we must note Fromm's relationship to Friedrich Nietzsche, whose influence on the development of dynamic psychiatry and its smaller offspring psychoanalysis, is in the words of Henri Ellenberger 'impossible to overestimate'.² "More so even than Bechoven", states Ellenberger, "Nietzsche may be considered the common source of Freud, Adler, and Jung."³ What interests us here is not the possible isomorphisms between Nietzschean concepts and psychoanalytic categories, but rather the similarity of approach in the prophesy of Nietzsche and Fromm. Ellenberger correctly identifies the spirit of Nietzsche's work as an 'unmasking trend' begun in the nineteenth century in an attempt to reveal the true essence of a degenerate culture.⁴ Marx was of course prior to Nietzsche in this trend because he unmasked the essence of capitalist society via a critique of political economy. But it is

notable that although Fromm calls himself a Marxist, he refrains from economic analysis and confines himself to unmasking the psychological structure of modern society. In this sense he follows a Nietzschean, not Marxian, tradition, because it was Nietzsche who first dared to extensively indict modern culture from the psychological point of view. The spirit of Nietzsche's works such as Twilight of the Idols, Or How One Philosophizes With A Hammer (perhaps better stated 'psychologizes with a hammer'), is paralleled by Fromm's attempts to use psychoanalysis to indict virtually everything modern culture stands for.

Like Nietzsche, Fromm also feels he is the bad conscience of his time, and like Nietzsche also, he believes the way to find out what has gone wrong is to examine the origin of modern attitudes.⁵ Fromm agrees with Nietzsche's statement: "For psychology is now again the road to the basic problems."⁶ Both Fromm and Nietzsche realise they must go outside the sterile logic of the system of social mystification -- a system of psychological bondage that constantly eludes the awareness of those under its influence. They speak of human types which live under the illusion that all is healthy, when in actuality the very premises of an authentic human existence have long disappeared. Likewise, in their attempts to proclaim a new species of man,

for Nietzsche the 'overman', for Fromm the 'productive character', both thinkers aim at world-reform, nothing less than a 'revaluation of all values' to make man 'human' once more.

Fromm has pointed to the sources of both his psychoanalytic interest in behaviour and his desire for human harmony in his intellectual biography, Beyond The Chains Of Illusion (1962). A moody father and a depression prone mother, plus the suicide of a young woman artist friend of the family in response to her father's death, sparked his interest in the causation of human behaviour.⁷ His interest in human unanimity was the result of his youthful studies in the Old Testament which he recalls "... touched me and exhilarated me more than anything else I was exposed to."⁸ Specifically the account of Adam and Eve's disobedience and the prophetic writings of Isaiah, Amos and Hosea were the greatest influence on him.

The vision of universal peace and harmony between all nations touched me deeply when I was twelve and thirteen years old. Probably the immediate reason for the absorption by the idea of peace and internationalism is to be found in the situation in which I found myself: a Jewish boy in a Christian environment, experiencing small episodes of anti-semitism but, more importantly a feeling of strangeness and clannishness on both sides. I disliked clannishness, maybe all the more so because I had an overwhelming wish to transcend the emotional isolation of a lonely pampered boy; what could be more exciting and

beautiful to me than the prophetic vision of universal brotherhood?⁹.

The event he believes to have determined more than anything else his development was the First World War, which fused his interest in the causation of behaviour with his vision of peace and harmony.¹⁰ Initially the young Fromm went through a period of excitement and enthusiasm for the war, but the death of relatives and the waves of hysteria sweeping Germany soon awakened a deep pessimism in him. As the war continued and the situation worsened the desire to return to the question 'how is it possible?' increased, until finally "When the war ended in 1918 I was a deeply troubled young man who was obsessed by the question of how war was possible, by the wish to understand the irrationality of human mass behaviour, by a passionate desire for peace and international understanding.¹¹

The prophetic vision of universal brotherhood and human self-actualization so common in Fromm's work is also inherent in the personages he knew in his youth, and in the Judaic tradition as a whole. To begin with, Fromm greatly admired the image of his great-grandfather, Rabbi Seligmann Baer Bamberger, a renowned teacher and prophetic personage of sorts who worked to fuse the split between Orthodox and Reformed Jews in Germany.¹² Bamberger had become one of the leaders of German Orthodoxy in Bavaria in 1836 during the period when

another Orthodox leader, S.R. Hirsch, Rabbi of Frankfurt, advocated a separation of Orthodox Judaism from all other forms, especially reformed Judaism. Bamberger refuted this idea, believing the battle between Orthodox and Reformed Jews should be fought within the general community of Jews. His fame as a teacher stems from his founding of the last great yeshiva (institute of Talmudic studies), the Jewish Teachers College of Wuerzburg which exercised a considerable influence in Germany at that time. Later he became one of the spiritual fathers of the Misrachi, the (Orthodox) religious Zionist organization founded in 1901 which participated in the establishment of the Israeli state.¹³ The image of Bamberger as a great teacher and leader is noteworthy in the context of Fromm's later advocacy of international understanding.

The proximity of Fromm to the Judaic faith, which he officially left in 1926, is however not clear-cut. One of his recent works, You Shall Be As Gods (1966), was based on a radically humanist interpretation of the Old Testament and outlined his position as regards religion in general. As a youth he had acquired his knowledge of Judaism from three teachers whom he calls representatives of the humanistic wing of Judaism, and despite his present divergence from their views he states "... it is my conviction that at no point has the

continuity between their teaching and my views been interrupted."¹⁴. Convinced that Judaism is more an ethical than a religious system, Fromm believes its essence reduces itself to the idea that mankind need not worship God for its salvation, but rather need only refrain from blaspheming Him and worshipping idols.¹⁵ The religious experience is not necessarily connected to a theistic concept, because what is essentially religious is the adherence to certain values such as love thy neighbor, not the recognition of 'God per se'.¹⁶ Seen in this light the Jew who follows only the law (Torah) is also a very religious person, and indeed according to Judaic thought also one who will earn divine grace.¹⁷ In the sense that the values inherent in Fromm's humanism are at the same time values inherent in Judaism, one can say he is still a member of the Judaic faith. Yet his roster of humanistic values is also common to Christianity and Eastern religions, meaning he is also an 'adherent' of those faiths. This confirms the fact that he left Judaism in order to identify with what is humanistic in all religions.¹⁸

The importance of You Shall Be As Gods does, however, go beyond the foregoing because it clearly demonstrates the similarities between the Jewish tradition of prophecy concerning man, and Fromm's prophetic-sounding theories on human self-actualization.

The central theme of the Judaic tradition as described in the Old Testament is, in Fromm's view, man's liberation from submissiveness to his environment, oppressive family ties, and above all from submission to authoritarian entities.¹⁹ The Old Testament is radically humanist because it tells of "... a global philosophy which emphasizes the oneness of the human race, the capacity of man to develop his own powers and arrive at inner harmony and at the establishment of a peaceful world. Radical humanism considers the goal of man to be complete independence, and this implies penetrating through fictions and illusions to a full awareness of reality."²⁰ In this sense the central theme of biblical history is, for Jewish humanism, the process whereby man develops his powers of reason and love, and becomes fully human by 'returning to himself':²¹ it promotes in Fromm's words "... what the serpent, symbol of wisdom and rebellion -- promised, and what the patriarchal, jealous God of Adam did not wish: that man would become a God like himself."²² In this sense too the Jewish covenants with God throughout biblical history represent man's decisive transition towards freedom, even from God himself, since man is now a partner with a God who has been dethroned from an 'absolute to a constitutional monarch'.²³ Blind slavery to the Deity is now out of the question.²⁴ The time of the Messiah

is in Fromm's interpretation the kairotic point at which man will be fully self-actualizing and proceed to live in harmony with his surroundings.²⁵ Fromm's interpretation of biblical history as a drama of as yet unfulfilled human self-actualization, also has one other quality in common with his psychoanalytical theories on the potential rebirth of man out of the authoritarianism of modern society. Both are dramas whose final outcomes are still pending and therefore have the same tone of urgency to them; for Fromm the final 'judgement day' is possibly the last day of any form of human life at all, namely nuclear holocaust. Only the three cardinal principles of prophetic ethics (common to both the Judaic tradition and Fromm's work*) can make the final outcome a beatific one. They involve justice -- to prevent the deprivation of a person's legitimate powers; loving kindness -- to love one's neighbor as oneself; and humility -- the knowledge that man cannot be self-sufficient, and needs other persons to exist.²⁶

The Hasidic sector of Jewish tradition is also important in relation to Fromm's prophetic humanism. Fromm learned about Hasidism from his teacher S.B. Rabinkow, an outstanding Talmudist and Hasidic Jew with

*especially as advocated in May Man Prevail? (1961), a book he wrote against nuclear armament.

whom he studied for several years in Heidelberg between 1918-1922, and who can be said to have exerted the greatest influence on him in this area of learning.²⁷ Concisely stated, Hasidism (modern Hasidism) arose as a movement in Poland in the 18th century and emphasized an exalted simplicity and devotion above the legalism and arid intellectualism of rabbinical Judaism.²⁸ Its leader was Rabbi Israel ben Eleizer (1700-1760), originally a simple teacher and later a magic healer who finally gathered about him a group of disciples dedicated to a life of mystic fervor, joy, and love.²⁹ Most of his teachings appealed to the mysticism found in the Kaballah and Zohar.


What interests us here is not the entire corpus of Hasidic beliefs, but rather its views on human self-actualization as contained in the 'doctrine of the sparks'. According to this doctrine the universe was created via a series of emanations from God. Space had been ordered into a series of bowls or vessels which were to receive the divine light. A disruption of this process occurred when these vessels containing the divine light were shattered, and the sparks of divine light were trapped in the material fragments of the broken vessels; this marked the introduction of evil into the universe. "In the physical world the sparks are surrounded by hard shells of darkness, a type of

negative evil."³⁰ Hasidic belief holds that it is in man's power to restore the original celestial harmony by releasing the sparks of divine light from the material world, and thereby reconcile this world with the divine one.³¹ A regimen of mystical practises and devotions could raise these sparks, which are inherent in every person regardless of their social status.³² The day-to-day life of Hasidic adherents was indeed pregnant with redemptive significance.³³ Individual differences between people were considered to be an important object of cultivation because God manifested himself in all persons differently.³⁴ Hasidism also attempted to cultivate humility, according to which a person should abandon inauthentic feelings of separateness from his fellow human beings, for an authentic personality emphasizing his uniqueness yet his essential unity with others of the community.³⁵ There is an obvious comparison between the Hasidic motif of the divine sparks man must redeem inside himself, and the human self 'redeemed' in the psychoanalytic process as Fromm sees it. In that Hasidism, like other more orthodox forms of Judaism, presents us with a drama of alternatives wherein the outcome is either a new more human existence or the night of sub-humaness, it is akin to Fromm psycho-analytical alternativism.

Significantly enough, the sociological tradition within which Fromm studied and worked also had inherently prophetic tendencies, and it is to this tradition that we now turn. Until the exodus of virtually all noteworthy German sociologists in 1933, German sociology had cultivated a tradition virtually untouched by outside influences.³⁶ It was preoccupied largely with the influences of Hegel, whose dialectical concepts and method had far-reaching effects, not the least of these being a tendency to blur the line between philosophic concepts (especially metaphysics and historical eschatology with which his work is replete) and analytical sociological method (empirical or otherwise).³⁷ This meant that the a priori philosophic attitude towards a given society is scarcely different from the analytic methods used to examine it.³⁸ This influence was subsequently reinforced by the continuing weakness of German sociology in the area of research methods, and often produced a mixture of ideology and so-called sociological scientific method wherein prophesy could easily find a prominent place. In other words, philosophic bias easily crept into sociological speculation, especially a tendency to fuse historical data with sociological theory to form a quasi-drama about human development.

The work of Alfred Weber, Fromm's teacher and thesis supervisor at the University of Heidelberg emphatically stressed the necessity of value-judgements in sociology. His method began from a holistic viewpoint by asking "What is the condition of the human spiritual essence in its transformations and variations in the historical process?"³⁹. In other words, under what conditions, with what means, and against what resistances does the human being persist in the world-historical process?⁴⁰. The dictum that human persistence strives towards freedom and to be fully human is the central theme of Weber's work.⁴¹ Out of this came Weber's attempts to make of his investigations an 'education to reality' of the human race. "Alfred Weber made no secret of the fact that he followed with his sociology the desire to help mankind (which he saw as being endangered in a crisis) to a consciousness centered on its original track, and by presenting the historical process and that which is of essence or should be of essence in it, to help mankind find its way to such a self-realization."⁴². This aim does not, by and large, diverge from the aims of Fromm's work in the humanist-psychoanalytic sphere.

Many of Fromm's colleagues shared Weber's sentiments about the function of social research. Theodore Adorno, Fromm's later colleague at the Institute



of Social Research (Frankfurt) in the 1920's and 30's, stated in his Sociological And Empirical Research that the purely empirical production of facts is equally as ideological as a sociology which has philosophically determined directions, since mere description tacitly supports the given social order, even 'restores' it.⁴³

For Adorno true sociological theory was also eschatology, since the aim of social analysis was to produce or at least show the way for the proper conditions that would usher in a new society. Social theory was for him an instrument for social change; "It should lift the stone under which the bad elements of society breed."⁴⁴

Adorno's associate Theodore Geiger also advocated the rational examination of man and society to further humanistic values. Ferdinand Tonnies, still another influential German sociologist, was also for radical social reform, and contended the subject matter of sociology was the emergence of man.⁴⁵

Above all, the German sociologist who blurred the lines between a priori philosophical attitudes towards society and the method used to analyse it was Karl Marx, with whom Fromm more or less identified himself. The result of Marx's work was prophesy reaching new heights of sophistication. Fromm's attempted mixture of psychoanalysis and Marxism was nothing other than an effort to renew the prophetic tradition of Karl Marx in light of

twentieth century conditions. Indeed, Fromm thought he had re-discovered the true Marx in the Economic And Philosophical Manuscripts, which he was the first to translate for the English speaking world as Marx's Concept of Man (1961). That book specifically names Marx as a prophet who had not only pointed the way to an alternative future, but who also continues a larger tradition of humanistic prophesy existent in the Western world for hundreds of years. Marx's work is the 'realization of the deepest religious impulses common to the great humanistic religions of the past'.⁴⁶ His anti-religious sentiment was not a rejection of the ideals of perfection for which God stands, but only a protest against idol-worshipping; it was actually 'the most advanced form of rational mysticism'.⁴⁷

It is hardly possible to talk about Marx's attitude toward religion without mentioning the connexion between his philosophy of history, and of socialism, with the Messianic hope of the Old Testament prophets and the spiritual roots of Humanism in Greek and thinking.⁴⁸

Thus Marx and other forms of socialism are the heirs of prophetic Messianism, Christian Chiliastic sectarianism, thirteenth century Thomism, Renaissance Utopianism, and eighteenth century Enlightenment.⁴⁹

Yet Marx's prophesying was actually the result of mythological thinking, as Robert Tucker has explained in his Philosophy and Myth In Karl Marx. Almost a century

before Fromm, Marx was acutely aware of the internal human conflict between forces of authenticity and self-actualization, and forces of inauthenticity and slavery to an authoritarian system. The worker, aware that his potentials and energies are alienated from him and aware of the inhuman social role he must play, comes to resent his condition. Marx attempted to explain this neurosis by appealing to the larger social conditions for its causes, neglecting to appeal in any measure to forces inside the person himself.⁵⁰ Tucker contends his crucial step was to transfer the structure of the alienated mind to the structure of society as a whole; the neurosis on the personal level became a 'social neurosis' between different classes. It was, to quote Tucker, "... the doctrinal enclosure of a mythic vision in which the dualism of conflicting forces of the alienated self was apprehended as a dualism of social forces...."⁵¹ Failing to see alienation is only in a derivative way an economic or social fact, Marx lapsed into the chief characteristic of mythical thought -- to perceive something exterior which is actually interior.⁵²

It is through and through a moralistic myth, a tale of good and evil, a story of struggle between constructive and destructive forces for possession of the world. Its underlying moral theme is the theme of original Marxism: man's division against himself and dehumanization under the despotism of greed, and his final emancipation of himself and his

productive activity from this despotism by the seizure of the alienated world of private property.⁵³

Capital, states Tucker, was accordingly not a book depicting actual realities, but was only a book of revelation composed of carefully culled and collated accounts of British factory conditions, cautiously leaving out whatever did not fit into the mythic schema of the impending inevitability of the revolution.⁵⁴ As such it was not written as an analysis of how capitalism works, but to demonstrate that forces inside it will bring on its demise.⁵⁵ "The object was to write an obituary of capitalism in advance of its decease."⁵⁶ More clearly stated, it was a book of prophecy.

Fromm's association with Marxist prophecy was not marked by the same belief in the inevitability of revolution, and at this point his prophecies are intimately linked to the fate of the Frankfurt School of sociologists in Germany. The School, founded in 1924 and formally known as the Institute fuer Sozialforschung, maintained a loose relationship with the University of Frankfurt as a neutral institution on campus.⁵⁷ Fromm was one of its most prominent members, and belonged to the inner circle of researchers gathered around Max Horkheimer that included Friedrich Pollock, Leo Lowenthal, Theodore Adorno, and Herbert Marcuse.⁵⁸ The Institute's origins lie in the post World War One era

when Marxism faced the dilemma of having to choose between following moderate socialists in their support of the Weimar Republic, accepting the leadership of Russian communists and therefore undermining the Weimar Republic, or conducting a "... searching re-examination of the very foundations of Marxist theory with the dual hope of explaining past errors and preparing for future action."⁵⁹. The Institut chose the latter course, never aligning itself with any leftist parties, and its members varying considerably in their approach to Marx's work. These approaches were expressed in the various studies on such topics as anti-semitism (members with Jewish background abounded at the Institut), authoritarianism, Nazism, aesthetics, mass culture, and various themes on sociological method.⁶⁰. Acutely aware of the potential danger of fascism in Germany and the threat it posed to mankind, the Institut believed its studies an important contribution to the preservation of what was humanistic in the then threatened German culture. "Indeed, one of the key elements in the Institut's self-image was this sense of being the last outpost of a waning culture."⁶¹. Its member's felt their best contribution towards defeating authoritarianism was to intensify their analysis of contemporary culture, and repressive doctrines.⁶².

Out of this arose the systematic critique of ideas and culture they called 'Critical Theory'. Based on the Marxian world-view, Critical Theory was intended as a gadfly on others' systems, especially positivism and vitalism and their twentieth-century offspring.⁶³ Where positivism had ceased to be 'negative' (critical) in the revolutionary sense because its pre-occupation with 'facts' had entailed the loss of the ability to tell right from wrong, subjectivism had over-stressed subjectivism at the expense of facts altogether, and resulted in a 'mindless irrationalism' of its twentieth century followers.⁶⁴ For example, Edmund Husserl's phenomenology was criticized for tacitly supporting the existing bourgeois social order, since it aimed at objective 'description of the world as it is'.⁶⁵ Husserl's pupil Martin Heidegger, also became anathema for his refusal to recognize socio-political conditions as being relevant to his existentialism, a philosophy which Critical Theory later believed to have joined forces with irrationalism and the Nazi glorification of blood and soil.⁶⁶ And Leo Lowenthal, one of Fromm's closest friends, concluded Dostoevsky's intense interest in the human psyche to be sterile because of its 'ideological distortion' ensuing from a blindness to the social origins of psychological conditions.⁶⁷

"Underlying everything, however, was the goal of social change."⁶⁸. Yet members of the Frankfurt School knew their attempts at Marxist social change would be difficult if conducted consistent with rigid nineteenth-century interpretations of Marxism. Fromm, along with many of the School began to see that the worker was not necessarily automatically suited to the role of revolutionary, because capitalism itself had changed into a form enabling a more tight integration of the worker into the system.⁶⁹.

The intellectual who slavishly echoed whatever the proletariat seemed to desire was thus abdicating his own true function, which was to persistently stress possibilities transcending the present order. In fact, tension between intellectuals and workers was currently necessary in order to combat the proletariat's conformist tendencies. Thus Critical Theory did not see itself simply as the expression of the consciousness of one class.... Instead, it was willing to ally itself with all progressive forces willing 'to tell the truth'.⁷⁰.

Marx never foresaw that the modern proletariat could become so psychologically enslaved to a society that the objective factors operating it would never by themselves bring about revolution, a realisation which was to be the central theme of Fromm's entire later work. No longer was class antagonism an open and explicit factor as original Marxism had thought, rather the amputation of certain portions of character had caused its

virtual disappearance. Fromm, along with other members of the Frankfurt School realised that the first Critical Theorists, namely the young Hegelians of the 19th century to which Marx had belonged, had lived in a time when the proletariat was stirring; their critique of society was based on the existence of a real subject.⁷¹ "By the time of its renaissance in the twentieth century, Critical Theory was being increasingly forced into a position of transcendence by the withering away of the revolutionary working class."⁷² Once they were robbed of their audience, Fromm and his co-workers considered it imperative to look more critically and with more sophisticated tools at what had gone wrong, since any criticism of society now had to function in a radically effective manner.

Recognizing that a retreat into a thinly disguised version of orthodox Marxist dogma on the objective laws operating in society would be a regression into sterility, Fromm saw the problem of revolution is a human one, and therefore needs a human answer which only psychoanalysis could provide. In light of the psychic integration of the working class into capitalist society, explanations involving such psychological metaphors as 'socially patterned defects', 'amputated character', and 'non-productive character orientations' made vastly more sense because they treat psychological

problems in psychological terms, something economic formulas were helpless to do.⁷³ Marx had underestimated the complexity of human passions, resulting in three dangerous errors: the neglect of the moral factor in man; a 'grotesque misjudgement of the chances for the realization of socialism'; the naive assumption that the transformation of the means of production would be sufficient in themselves to consummate a socialist society.⁷⁴ The subsequent details of Fromm's attempts to rectify and go beyond what Marx had said have been made clear to us in the initial chapters of this essay.

More important is the increasingly gloomy tone of Fromm's prophesy. For someone who believes "... the First World War was the beginning of a process of brutalization that continues to this day,"⁷⁵ it is difficult to pronounce violence as a means to a new society. This belief makes itself conspicuously felt through the absence of metaphors such as 'class struggle' and 'political revolution' in his writings. Moreover, Fromm's characterology rejects violence as necrophilic, as the ultimate sign of resentment against life, and a symbol of human impotence to properly master the situations existence presents. Revolution is accordingly a pathological phenomenon. Fromm believes it was Marx's tragic mistake that he did not free himself from the traditional emphasis on political power and force

that was later to become the basis of Stalinism.⁷⁶ Marx and Engels, he points out, never claimed violence as the only means to a humanistic society, but they were misinterpreted to this effect by the majority of revolutionaries.⁷⁷ Furthermore, the threat of nuclear holocaust as the result of revolutionary violence bringing major power blocs to confrontation, proved to be a significant factor in Fromm's thoughts. In an attempt to cut through what he calls 'paranoic thinking' inherent on both Russian and American sides, Fromm wrote May Man Prevail? (1961) at a time when nuclear conflagration was considered an imminent possibility. It expressed his belief that the Soviet state had shown no more expansionism than any of the Western powers, and that its policy was actually one of defending its position to consolidate the revolution.⁷⁸ Even in the unlikely case that an arms race would prevent nuclear war by its deterrent effects, Fromm thought the quality of life under the shadow of constantly poised missiles would lead to a 'hardening of the heart' and a subsequent abandoning of humanist values.⁷⁹ The net result would be an indifference towards the quality of life which "... will transform us into barbarians -- though barbarians equipped with the most complicated machines."⁸⁰ Seven years later it seems Fromm had exhausted even more of his optimism, but not his drive to be a prophet, albeit a somewhat

gloomy prophet. The occasion was his book The Revolution of Hope (1968) wherein he presented the reader with a dualistic picture of human alternatives: "... we are at the crossroads: one road leads to a completely mechanized society -- if not destruction by thermonuclear war; the other to a renaissance of humanism and hope -- to a society that puts technique in the service of man's well-being."⁸¹. The gist of that book's message was 'although we have run into seemingly insurmountable obstacles, we should not lose faith in ourselves, nor dynamic hope for a better society'. Similarly, his most recent work The Anatomy Of Human Destructiveness (1973), bases itself on the rather gloomy prospect that culture is becoming more destructive, and therefore attempts to demonstrate necrophilia as an unnecessary option for mankind.

Ironically, Fromm finds himself in somewhat of a Freudian position. As Rieff explained earlier, Freud produced a psychotherapy whose aims in the absence of news about a stable and governing order anywhere, became actively involved in mitigating the miseries of everyday living. So too the world as Fromm perceives it has no immediate news of a stable and more humanistic order, and the work of the psychoanalyst must content itself with enlightening individual patients towards authenticity, and enabling them to live amidst a

cultural wasteland. For it is these few self-actualizing types which in Fromm's view have brought mankind out of the caves and maintained what is humanistic in culture,^{82.} and under these conditions psychoanalysis is a form of Critical Theory with a drastically reduced audience.

The intellectual fate of other members of the Frankfurt School is remarkably similar to Fromm's, despite his dissociation with the School at an early stage (1939). After World War Two most members of the School became increasingly pessimistic about the ability of Critical Theory to provide the long-awaited revision of Marxism which would result in a union of neo-Marxist theory and revolutionary practise.^{83.}

Disillusioned with the Soviet Union, no longer even marginally sanguine about the working classes of the West, appalled by the integrative power of mass culture, the Frankfurt School travelled the last leg of its long march away from orthodox Marxism.^{84.}

The upshot of this pessimism was for them to concentrate increasingly on problems above and beyond Marx and class struggle, as reflected in their intense discussion of the conflict between man and nature. Marx was increasingly spoken of as being 'Enlightenment' in his outlook, and accused of deifying the rational faculty as a tool for the exploitation of nature. Rationality as a humanistically liberating force led, paradoxically, to its opposite. "Man as the measure of all things

inherently meant man as the master of nature. It was the overemphasis on man's autonomy that paradoxically led to man's submission, as a fate of nature became man's own."⁸⁵ Rationalism, as much as its opposite irrationalism, became for them the internal logic of fascist domination. "In fact, Critical Theory was now incapable of suggesting a critical praxis."⁸⁶ Critical Theory had to become a more and more muted endeavour, to the point where it became a form of praxis itself.⁸⁷ The danger of sparking world-wide nuclear disaster, as well as the fact that violent revolution is necrophilic, made Fromm shy away from any grand calls to action of classical Marxist nature. Likewise, he feels it is becoming increasingly difficult to uphold the genuine humanist ideal in the midst of a general atmosphere of distortion brought on by bureaucratization and technization in both communist-socialist and capitalist worlds.⁸⁸ Except for the very limited realm of psychotherapy, the mediation of theory with praxis became just as difficult for Fromm as for the Frankfurt School, and he too has contented himself with the role of the sage, perhaps modelled unconsciously on the Jewish prophet.

X: Conclusion

Whatever our judgement of Fromm's work, we must be aware that like all other scientific paradigms it is dependent upon a certain social milieu for its validity. The relevance of its component metaphors depends upon their usefulness in illuminating facets of existence. We must keep this in mind when we consider Fromm's claim that his psychoanalytic discoveries are 'objectively true' or when he states: "There is not a single theoretical conclusion about man's psyche, either in this or my other writings, which is not based on a critical observation of human behaviour...."¹. My concluding remarks will offer only some guidelines for placing the alleged 'objectivity' of Fromm's metaphors in proper perspective.

As I mentioned in the introduction to this paper, Thomas Kuhn has made it clear that what is called 'scientifically objective' is actually only objective within a certain social framework. Science, states Kuhn, is a network of commitments to conceptual paradigms that influence the shape of the researcher's questions and his answers.². Most often these paradigms

are tacit, functioning as an unconscious undercurrent to any investigative procedure of which most science is rarely aware.³ Paradigms strive to create consensus amongst researchers about a wide variety of phenomena, an invalid investigative result being one which is excluded from consensus.⁴ According to Kuhn, one of the major qualities of scientific paradigms is their power to insulate an investigative community from important problems and data simply because they do not make available the necessary conceptual and perceptual apparatus.⁵ Scientific revolutions occur when paradigms are loosened to the point where new conceptual modes and terminology enable a community to consider hitherto unthinkable directions of research.⁶

But all other investigative procedures may also be considered as a series of metaphors applied to the subject at hand, with varying rules for their use. As in the 'hard' sciences, the consensus of the community most often determines the range of these metaphors, and the result is always a system of perceptual guidelines isolating what a particular approach feels is important. However, it is the inability of any one series of metaphors to exactly and comprehensively describe all phenomena which insures a mosaic of approaches by various disciplines. Werner Heisenberg has pointed very clearly to this fact in Physics And Philosophy:

Any concepts or words which have been formed in the past through the interplay between the world and ourselves are not really sharply defined with respect to their meaning; that is to say we do not know exactly how far they will help us in finding our way in the world. We often know that they can be applied to a wide range of inner or outer experience, but we practically never know precisely the limits of their applicability. This is true of the simplest and most general concepts like 'existence' and 'space and time'. Therefore, it will never be possible by pure reason to arrive at some absolute truth.⁷

Both artistic and scientific metaphors, states Heisenberg, speak about all forms of reality in different ways, an artistic one often being more effective than a scientific one.⁸

One of the most readily discernible features about the field of psychology is its variety of communities claiming their paradigms and metaphors to be objectively valid. This sometimes reaches the point where a certain consensual group within the field of psychic research labels dissenting members, or persons outside the group who disagree with their particular metaphors, as being 'sick' or 'insane'. We have already encountered the case of Fromm, who described C.G. Jung as a necrophilic person (considered by Fromm a form of insanity), as being lonely and insecure, a producer of fantasies, and as being dominated by psychic conflict. All this he attributed to Jung's particular investigative preoccupation with the contents of the unconscious.

Psychological systems have a tendency towards forming a 'total ideology', defined by Karl Mannheim to be a comprehensive system of perceptions and perceptual methods which present us with an all-inclusive picture of what is 'real'.⁹ A 'particular ideology' is by contrast defined as perceiving only certain portions of the world in a way considered to be the 'final truth'; it encompasses no comprehensive system of perceptions, and is identified with interests or biases in limited areas.¹⁰ It is difficult to escape the feeling that Fromm's work is of the 'total ideology' variety. His indictment of Western civilization aims at its very roots, and claims alienated man is no longer 'partially de-humanized' as in Marx's day, but totally 'de-humanized' to the point where he does not even perceive his 'de-humanization'. He divides the world into almost mythological components of 'good' and 'evil' (authentic, self-actualizing, and de-humanized, authoritarian), whose secular drama unfolds before our very eyes in the evolution of modern societies; his books clearly delineate what he places on the 'good' side, and what is under the influence of 'evil', and there are few things on the latter side which he does not 'tear apart' in psychoanalytic terms. Such indictments recall Mannheim's statements on the invalidation of another person's perceptions so characteristic of 'total ideology'.

... previously one's adversary, as a representative of a certain political-social position, was accused of conscious or unconscious falsification. Now, however, the critique is more thoroughgoing in that, having discredited the total structure of his consciousness, we consider him no longer capable of thinking correctly.¹¹

Jung, as we saw, was one of Fromm's victims in just such an accusation. Similarly, he downgrades the results of certain existential psychoanalysts such as Ludwig Binswanger and Medard Boss for substituting vague philosophical notions for precise clinical data.¹² In other words, Fromm thinks little of the ability of their metaphors to describe what he believes is a precise picture of the human condition. Another example of where Fromm's perceptual paradigms exclude elements from his field of vision is his concentration on mild forms of so-called mental illness. Problems of severe schizophrenia and psychosis do not interest him because their relevance for political and social criticisms seems virtually nil. Perhaps, judging by the over-reaction he gave to Jung's work, Fromm even fears being caught up in the internal complexity and fascinating structure of these mental states, and thus risk receding farther and farther from open social criticism (as Jung had done).

Furthermore, psychoanalysis is extremely vulnerable to the total conception of ideology because of

its reliance on linguistic evidence. Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835) clearly stated the nature of metaphors:

Man lives with his objects chiefly -- in fact, since his feeling and acting depends on his perceptions, one may say exclusively -- as language presents them to him. By the same process whereby he spins language out of his own being, he ensnares himself in it; and each language draws a magic circle round the people to which it belongs from which there is no escape save stepping out of it into another.¹³.

The ability of a patient to incorporate the psychoanalyst's metaphors into his own thought processes and hence his entire perceptual experience, has been pointed out by Henri Ellenberger. Persons analysed by a Freudian will have Freudian dreams and become aware of an Oedipus complex, while Jungian analysts will engender awareness of Jungian archetypes and the individuation process, and so on, for other systems.¹⁴. More clearly stated, the 'magic circle' of which Humboldt speaks, will under conditions of psychoanalysis eventually include the patient, especially if the analyst seeks the patient's commitment as a prerequisite to a successful healing process.

Ellenberger states that we must judge psycho-analytic metaphors in terms of their specific feelings for psychic reality as influenced by the analyst's life.¹⁵. In Fromm's case we know the dominant feelings

in his life as being outrage at the prevalence of brutalization, violence, and manipulation of persons occurring in the twentieth century. His characterology, like all of his analytic results, must therefore be considered the product of a tacit, value-imbued, outlook. Ellenberger reminds us:

Who has ever been able to measure libido, ego strength, the superego, the anima, individuation, and the like? The very existence of these entities has never been demonstrated. But to those psychiatrists who devote themselves exclusively to dealing with their patients in the immediate psycho-therapeutic situation, these terms are not abstract conceptualizations; they are living realities whose existence is more tangible than the statistics and computations of experimental researchers.¹⁶

Or, as Kuhn poses the question when he describes early modern chemists working on the same general class of phenomena: "Did these men really see different things when looking at the same sorts of objects?"¹⁷. The weight, indeed the credibility we ascribe to psychological paradigms (especially Fromm's paradigms), thus depends on the degree of applicability we feel they have in our lives. They are bound by given historical situations and eras, and therefore, given the nature and context of Fromm's work, it is equally possible present or succeeding generations may well reject his metaphors for the human condition as 'unreal' and hence inapplicable.

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